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The successful launch of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Petite Amateur Navy
Satellite (PANSAT) led to the development of a follow-on satellite program NPSat. Until
now, there did not exist a NPS specific cost modeling procedure to ensure accurate
pricing information for program management. From the Preliminary Design Review of
NPSat an initial attempt at modeling this program was conducted by the author. This
thesis will provide an evaluation of this initial model and address procedures for refining
the initial estimate with the purpose of providing a generic NPS Cost Model. This model
will tailor current commercial cost model outputs to provide accurate price estimates for
NPS specific programs. The commercial cost models used were Science Applications
International Corporation's (SAIC) NAFCOM model and Aerospace's Small Satellite
Cost Model (SSCM). These models do not take into account a university atmosphere
where staffs and facilities are reduced. A method of tailoring the outputs of these
programs was conducted and integrated into an Excel based spreadsheet. The resultant
product is the Naval Postgraduate School's first Cost Modeling program which allows
NPS satellite program management to input results from the SSCM and NAFCOM
models and output expected cost data.





B. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION'S NAFCOM COST MODELING PROGRAM 8
C. AEROSPACE CORPORATION'S SMALL SATELLITE COST
MODEL (SSCM) 9
D. COST BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (CBS) 11
II. PRELIMINARY COST MODEL OF THE NPSAT-1 PROGRAM 13
A. NPSAT-1 OVERVIEW 13
B. PROGRAM LENGTH 15
C. COST MODEL GUIDLINES 17
D. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL INITIAL APPROACH 20
E. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL ACTUAL APPROACH 22
F. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL RESULTS 23
m. COMPARISON OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
SPACECRAFT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES AND
FACILITIES WITH STANFORD UNIVERSITY CAPABILITIES 29
A. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL SPACE SYSTEM
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES 29
B. STANFORD UNIVERSITY SPACE SYSTEM DESIGN
CAPABILITIES AND COMPLETED PROGRAMS 34
IV. THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL COST MODEL 41
A. NPS COST MODEL METHODS 41
B. REFINEMENT OF NPSAT-1 COST ANALYSIS 45
C. REDUCING THE NPSAT-1 PROGRAM BUDGET 56
V. SUMMARY 61
A. NPS COST MODEL..: 61
B. REEVALUATING NPS' SATELLITE DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY 63
LIST OF REFERENCES 65
APPENDIX A. NPSAT-1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN COST BREAKDOWN 69
APPENDIX B. MONTE CARLO CONFIDENCE LEVELS 70
APPENDIX C. NPSAT-1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN REPORT
CALCULATIONS 71
vn
APPENDIX D. NPS COST MODEL USER INPUT SCREEN 74
APPENDIX E. NPS COST MODEL REPORT SCREEN 79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 101
Vlll
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
IX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The author would like to acknowledge the support of the Space System Academic
Group in providing computer hardware and software.
A special thanks to Dr. Stephen Book of Aerospace Corporation, LCDR Tim
Anderson of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Dr. Robert Twiggs of Stanford
University, Ms. Tara Clayborn of Science Applications International Corporation, Mr.
Fred Raymond of the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), Ms. Jackie Fiora of NASA's
Goddard Space Flight Center, Dr. Charles Barth of the University of Colorado, the Staff
Engineers of NPS: Dan Sakoda, Ron Phelps, Jim Horning, and Dave Rigmaiden. In
addition, the author would like to thank the assistance, advice, and patience of the
following NPS personnel: Professor Barry Leonard, Professor Chris Olsen, Professor
Richard Harkins, Ms. Jan Young, Dr. Alfred N. Sorensen, and Dr. Brij Agrawal.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
This thesis will address methodologies for performing cost modeling of Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) satellites. A comprehensive analysis was conducted of the
cost factors for associated program phases of the NPS Satellite (NPSat) program. A risk
assessment of resultant data and a probability examination of the projected results
provided insight into the expected likelihood of realizing the compiled results.
Procedures and results from the NPSat- 1 Preliminary Design phase will be addressed and
recommended procedures for refining these results will be discussed to provide NPS with
an effective cost modeling tool for any on-site designed and fabricated satellite. The
resulting tool is a Microsoft Excel based software tool which will allow for future NPS
Cost Analysts or Program Managers to use the outputs of commercial cost modeling
software as inputs to this program. Once entered, this data is processed through an
algorithm which provides for the unique problem of perfonning cost analysis in a
university environment. This document provides details of the initial cost model, a
comparison with Stanford University's facilities and capabilities with the satellite design
program at NPS, an explanation of the generic NPS Cost Model program, a refined
model, and recommendations for reducing costs to the current NPSat- 1 spacecraft design.
The main impetus behind effective cost analysis is to predict the cost of a program
within some level of probability and accuracy of actual expenditures. The very nature of
cost estimation is guessing the future cost or price of a program. In addition, a risk
assessment of input and output data must be conducted to account for analysts
unfamiliarity with specific programs, confidence in derived numbers or their sources, and
the complexity of specific aspects of the program being modeled. For risk assessment,
some method of accounting for confidence factors must be instituted to ensure actual cost
data reflects the appropriate risk factor associated with the specific derived figures.
(Raymond). Also, the derived cost model results should address the probability of
achieving these results to provide program management with a realistic range of values
for budgeting the program. (Anderson). Security provisions should be formulated in the
event these projected values do not materialize. This contingency procedure allows
flexibility to the program manager in assuring the program may continue despite
unforeseen delays, cost overruns, etc. It should be noted, although cost estimation has
continued to evolve into more of a science, it is also an art. There are many instances
when an applicable formula or concrete data does not exist so it remains the judgement of
the analyst to arrive at his or her best guess. To the knowledge of the author, there
currently does not exist commercial software dedicated to performing cost analysis of
university based satellite programs. The main objective of this thesis will be to explain
the preliminary analysis of NPSat and outline the NPS Cost Model which will perform a
cost analysis for NPS spacecraft. Due to the lack of supporting evidence for university
based models, there are instances where sound engineering judgement was relied upon
from inputs of industry experts or NPS staff and faculty. The only method to judge the
validity of the NPS Cost Model will be when the actual expenditures for the NPSat-
1
program are compared with the forecast cost. It is imperative accurate tracking of dollar
expenditures, personnel labor, and other costs is performed in order to compare forecast
cost versus actual cost.
Tools that we can use to more effectively perform a cost analysis are parametric
estimating (usually software programs), Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs), Work
Breakdown Structures (WBS), Cost Breakdown Structures (CBS), and direct
comparisons with existing satellite programs which closely resemble the program being
modeled. Parametric estimating is a technique that uses validated relationships between a
project's known technical, programmatic, and cost characteristics and known historical
resources consumed during the development, manufacture, and/or modification of an end
item. (Parametric Estimating Handbook, Chapt.l, p.l). CER's are defined as
mathematical expressions or formulas that are used to estimate the cost of an item or
activity as function of one or more relevant independent variables, also known as cost
drivers. An example of a CER for the initial cost estimation for a satellite is provided in
Equation (1-1). (Wertz and Larson, Space Mission Analysis and Design, Tab. 20-5).
Bus Cost (FY 1 992$) = 185* (Bus Mass)077 Eq. I-
1
Parametric models are more complex than CERs because they incorporate many
equations, ground rules, assumptions, logic, and variables that describe and define the
particular situation being studied and estimated. Parametric models make extensive use
of databases by cataloging program technical and cost history. (Parametric Estimating
Handbook, Chapt.l, pp. 1-2). These models typically use parametric equations which
rely on forecast cost drivers: spacecraft bus mass, power, subsystem performance, sensor
accuracies, etc. Commercial software programs routinely apply these parametric
techniques inherent in a database to arrive with a more defined modeling approach, such
as Aerospace's Small Satellite Cost Model (SSCM). Many industry and Government
representatives recognize parametrics as a practical estimating technique that can produce
credible cost estimates. In a memorandum to Directors of Defense Agencies, the
Director of Defense Procurement for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Mrs.
Eleanor Spector states,
I fully support the use of properly calibrated and validated
parametric cost estimating techniques on proposals submitted to DOD, and
I encourage your enthusiastic support . For many voluminous bills of
materials and grass roots engineering estimates of hours which must be
audited and updated throughout the course of a lengthy negotiation.
Instead we could rely on parametrics to price early design/development
effort, portions of follow-on production buys, or any other effort where
verifiable data exists to price parametrically. (Parametric Estimating
Handbook, pp. vii).
WBS are itemized task lists with associated costs for each task, i.e., the labor and
material cost associated with the fabrication of a honeycomb aluminum panel. The WBS
approach requires lengthy and often extremely tedious tracking of specific task cost
dependent on the level in which the WBS structure has been broken down. For early
program cost estimates, the WBS is usually not the method of choice. The CBS or "grass
roots" method allows for a detailed method of determining projected cost of circuit
boards, components, subsystems, and systems hardware. This approach can be used in
the early stages at the component level from vendor quotes on actual hardware prices.
Direct cost comparisons with existing programs have the advantage of observing a
spacecraft's planned cost with the actual cost and contingencies experienced during the
life of the program. The disadvantages associated with this technique are the requirement
to intricately know the capabilities of the observed programs personnel and facilities and
the cost data is usually sensitive. In the "Journal of Reducing Space Mission Cost", Dr
James R. Wertz points out,
There are many reasons for this sensitivity including the
proprietary nature of much of the data and the fact that for space systems,
cost depends far more on what the vendor is required to do than what is
actually being built. One of the best ways to make cost data known,
without jeopardizing proprietary data, is to make cost models public.
Some models are created at private expense and, therefore, should be
allowed to remain proprietary so that the developer can sell the
information to run a profitable business. However, many cost models are
created at public expense, either directly by government agencies or by
federal research centers or private contractors under government contracts.
In these cases, the cost models themselves (but not the proprietary data on
which they were based) should be made publicly available as a
fundamental knowledge resource for the community as a whole. (Wertz,
pp. 5-6).
No two programs are exactly alike, weather may delay a vehicle launch, testing
facilities scheduling may be delayed, engineers may retire, etc. So the direct comparison
technique presents many difficulties in accurately depicting expected costs for a future
satellite. (Preliminary Design Report, p. 8).
With the successful launch of NPS's Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT),
there has been continued interest in the design and fabrication of future NPS satellites.
For these follow-on satellites, the obvious choice for a cost comparison for future
programs would be this PANSAT program. However, it is imperative one must consider
the complexity of the future spacecraft and the availability of accurate historical cost
data. Unfortunately, PANSAT will not be a good choice for a comparison due to the lack
of historical cost data. Proposed future NPS satellites will be more complex in mission,
attitude control, data transfer and processing, and will eventually incorporate propulsion.
The author attempted to gather various university-based projects for this report to use as
valid cost comparisons. However, the proprietary dilemma Dr. Wertz discusses did
prove to be a formidable obstacle. The following satellite programs were referenced for
possible comparisons with the NPSat program:
• The Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer (FAST) of NASA's Small Explorer
(SMEX) program. This program provides frequent flight opportunities for
highly focused and relatively inexpensive space missions. SMEX spacecraft
are 180 to 250 kg with orbit-average power consumption of 50 to 200 watts.
Each mission is expected to cost approximately $35 million for design,
development, and operations through the first 30 days in orbit. SMEX
programs are managed by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in
Greenbelt, MD. Mission Set One consists of the FAST, Solar Anomalous and
Magnetospheric Particle Explorer (SAMPEX), and the Submillimeter Wave
Astronomy Satellite (SWAS). The first Small Explorer missions selection
announced April 4, 1989, were to study important questions in space physics,
astrophysics, and upper atmosphere science. FAST would investigate the
processes operating within the Auroral region and would be launched in mid-
1996. (SMEX Homepage).
• The University of Colorado's (UC) successful Student Nitric Oxide Explorer
(SNOE) program is an ideal spacecraft from which to base a cost comparison
for NPSat. The SNOE program is part of the Student Explorer Demonstration
Initiative (STEDI). This three year program aims to demonstrate that high-
quality space science and technology missions can be carried out with small,
low-cost, free-flying satellites on a time scale of two years from go-ahead
launch. The STEDI announcement of opportunity was released on May 12,
1994 and out of 66 proposals three satellite programs were chosen, SNOE,
Boston University's Tomographic Experiment using Radiative Recombinative
Ionospheric EUC and Radio Sources (TERRIERS), and the University ofNew
Hampshire's Cooperative Astrophysics and Technology Satellite (CATSAT).
(STEDI). Dr. Charles Barth, SNOE's Principal Investigator was very helpful
in providing spacecraft details and some programmatic data. The author was
unable to visit UC's Laboratory of Atmospherics and Space Physics (LASP)
due to their high tempo of operations. Phase II, Design and Development
expenditures were provided and some labor figures, but there was not enough
detail in labor dollars, hours, and personnel to accurately perform a
comparison with the NPSat-1 program and Colorado's successful SNOE
program. For follow on analysis to this thesis, a meeting with LASP staff
members to discuss more specific cost details is recommended. In addition,
an analysis of LASP' s satellite development facilities and capabilities must be
conducted in order to perform an accurate comparison.
• Stanford University in Palo Alto, CA was also contacted as an additional
source. Dr. Robert Twiggs, the Director of the Space Systems Design
Laboratory (SSDL) was more than helpful in providing useful information and
demonstrated the capabilities of their facility on a personal tour in October,
1999. Dr. Twiggs contributed estimates on expenditures, labor hours, and
personnel involved in completed and future SSDL satellite missions via Cost
Estimation templates provided by the author. Although Stanford's satellite
programs are dedicated to smaller microsatellites (usually less than 50 kg)
than the proposed NPSat, their method of design and development is
impressive and should be addressed. More details on Stanford's satellite
programs are discussed later in this document.
Of these three programs, only Stanford's philosophy will be addressed. SNOE
and FAST data is still outstanding and was unavailable upon the time of writing this
thesis. Their information should be included in any follow-on cost NPS cost analysis. In
addition, it was recently learned from the NPSat Chief Scientist, Professor Chris Olsen,
that the University of Colorado may become an active participant in the NPSat program.
The interest in a follow-on to PANSAT led to the conceptual design of the NPSat-
1 satellite from Space Systems Engineering students during the summer quarter of 1999
in the AA 4871 Spacecraft Design II class. Under the direction of Professor Barry
Leonard, the class produced a preliminary design of a three axis stabilized spacecraft with
a mission objective of delivering this satellite to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and imaging the
Earth's Aurora with a mission life of one year. During this design effort, the author of
this thesis was the Design Team Lead and Cost Analyst.
As with any spacecraft design program, an accurate means of performing a cost
analysis was sought with the intention of providing NPSat Program Management with
expected expenses over the life of the program. In today's world of "faster, cheaper,
better" satellites (Wertz, p. 7), it is imperative an accurate analysis of cost and risk is
conducted due to this new philosophy with reduced heritage. Larger, more expensive
programs routinely had a long line of in-house programs from which comparisons could
be made to provide a baseline for future missions. This alleviated the necessity for
meticulous cost modeling and provided some security in budgeting future missions. With
the shift to smaller satellites at reduced costs, this is no longer the case. In the 1960s,
satellites (Alpha, Pioneer, Explorer) were small inexpensive and built to answer basic
questions about Earth and near space. They were simple by nature, primarily due to
limited experience in satellite design and early launch vehicle capabilities. As knowledge
about spacecraft and launch vehicles grew, the Government and its satellite contractors,
gravitated to large, sophisticated, and expensive platforms to meet increasingly
demanding mission requirements. During the 1970s and 1980s, satellites carried more
powerful and often multiple payloads. Development costs were high as engineers and
scientists advanced testing techniques, hardware design, and software development to
achieve high degrees of success and longer-life operations. Major spacecraft grew to
more than one billion dollars and required decade-long development schedules. In the
1 990s, Government spending in the area of space science and technology experienced
dramatically increased fiscal scrutiny in the face of declining budgets. The constrained
environment led to changes in the way space systems were conceptualized, financed,
developed, launched, and operated. In parallel with the realization that funding for the
large, highly capable missions of the past would no longer be available, the terrestrial
microelectronics and software revolution reached space systems. Program Managers
were forced to look more aggressively at advanced technology to pack more capability
into smaller systems and to fit onto smaller, less expensive launch vehicles. (Bearden, pp.
1-2). Suddenly, the satellite industry was faced with the dilemma of formulating
accurate models without the benefit of heritage missions. This has led to the increased
use of parametric data and small satellite oriented cost models.
B. SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION'S
NAFCOM COST MODELING PROGRAM
The NASA/Air Force Cost Model (NAFCOM) is a parametric estimating tool for
space hardware. It is based on historical space projects and is intended to be used in the
preliminary design phases of satellite development. This model can be used at the
subsystem or component levels of a WBS for up to five different spacecraft systems. The
NASA Cost Model (NASCOM) database was developed for the Engineering Cost Office
ofNASA's Marshall Space Flight Center in 1989. The initial model reflected this name
until 1997 when Air Force data was incorporated and the name changed to NAFCOM.
Data was derived from source docum. r.tation found in NASA's Resource Data Storage
and Retrieval (REDSTAR) database. The NAFCOM model contains 100 space projects
including 78 unmanned spacecraft, 8 manned spacecraft, 4 engines, and 10 launch
vehicles. (NAFCOM Training Course). The following are some additional capabilities of
the NAFCOM model:
• Four methods for building the WBS: Specific analogy with existing satellite
in the database, database averages, user defined equations, and roll-ups which
automatically sum all cost from lower subsystem elements.
• Analogous Estimating for Hardware and System Integration: Analyst may
search the database for specific sub-system elements and filter data to create
the most analogous data and cost estimating relationship for hardware and
software integration.
• Technical and Programmatic Data: Supplied to provide a better understanding
of the background of data, including inheritance and budgetary and scheduling
anomalies to assist the user in understanding data points, selecting appropriate
analogies, and performing judgements for cost adjusting factors.
• Learning Curves: Option available to provide learning curves for production
cost.
• Contingency, Program Support, and Fee: The user may define contingency,
program support, and fee percentages to be applied to the estimate. Provides
recommended percentages for typical spacecraft programs. (NAFCOM
Training).
C. AEROSPACE CORPORATION'S SMALL SATELLITE COST MODEL
(SSCM)
The SSCM is a parametric cost model which runs on any Microsoft Excel-
supported platform. The latest version, SSCM98, estimates the development and
production costs of a small satellite bus for Earth-orbiting or near-planetary spacecraft.
The development of this model was motivated by the observation that traditional cost
models, based on larger civil and military systems, often times tended to drastically
overpredict the development cost of modern, smaller satellites. SSCM98 is the end-result
of over ten years of study at Aerospace Corporation. The development of the SSCM has
benefited from the efforts ofmany hours of data collection, normalization, and analysis,
and remains one of the most relevant and credible cost models today for performing
estimates of small spacecraft. The estimation methodology incorporated is suited to the
early, conceptual development phase of a spacecraft program, during which time the
design is likely to be less mature, and when cost and performance trades can be easily
performed. It consists of a collection of CER's which estimate the costs associated with
production of a spacecraft system with the following subsystems:




• TT&C / C&DH
• Structures & mechanisms
• Thermal control
CERs were also developed for Spacecraft Integration, Assembly and Test,
Program Level costs (Program Management and Systems Engineering), and Launch and
Orbital Operations Support. The first version of the model relied on an initial database of
ten small missions from the late 1980s and early 1990s. Although this initial release
focused on Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) programs, the data gathering
strategy has been applied to the (proprietary) acquisition of technical and cost
information of over sixty post- 1990 earth-orbiting and planetary missions, spanning Air
Fore , . L;OD, NASA, civil, and foreign programs. The database used for comparison
includes such diverse missions as STEP, FAST, Alexis, MSTI-1, Seastar, APEX, Lewis,
NEAR, ACE, Clementine, Mars Pathfinder, DS-1, and Lunar Prospector. Updated
versions are produced when a significant number ofnew satellite cost data are
incorporated into the database. There are currently two versions, SSCM98 Pro and
SSCM98 Intro. The Intro version was used for the cost analysis performed in this paper
and has the following features:
• Runs in Microsoft Excel 95.
• System-level cost estimation.
• Estimate can be generated with as few as one CER and as many as eight
(allows for preliminary estimate to made with minimum of available data).
• Estimate is weight-average of applicable CERs.
• Earth-orbiting spacecraft estimating capability only.
• Straightforward interface with spreadsheet based design tools.
• Easy-to-use graphical interface. (Aerospace Corporation).
10
D. COST BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE (CBS)
A Cost Breakdown Structure provides a method of a "bottom-up" approach for
price forecasting. In this method, we identify and specify a lower level of elements
making up the system. We then estimate the cost of materials and labor to develop and
produce each element. Because this method is time consuming and because detailed
design data is usually not available, this method is least appropriate for advanced system




























Figure 1 . Typical Cost Breakdown for Space Mission.
(Wertz and Larson, Spacecraft Mission Analysis and Design, Fig. 20-2).
A detailed CBS for the NPSat program is provided in Appendix A.
11
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II. PRELIMINARY COST MODEL OF THE NPSAT-1 PROGRAM
A. NPSAT-1 OVERVIEW
Prior to discussing the specifics of the NPSat-1 cost analysis, a brief summary of
the evolution of NPSat and the factors in it's design will be addressed.
In June 1999, NPS Space Systems Operations students presented the conceptual
design for the proposed Auroral X-Ray Infrared Imaging Satellite (AXIIS). The follow-
on to the PANSAT program, this satellite would also be built by NPS faculty, staff, and
students. With an expected on-orbit 1-year lifetime, this 3-axis stabilized satellite would
provide imaging data on the earth's Aurora in the northern and southern hemispheres.
The proposed configuration ofAXIIS and mission requirements included:
# A one-meter cubed structure with a mass of approximately 100 kilograms
(kg).
# Near Sun-synchronous polar orbit.
# Mission altitude requirement of 500-1 000 kilometers (km).
, Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS) and Guidance Control
and Navigation (GNC) with a pitch momentum wheel, three magnetic torque
rods along the spacecraft primary axes, a gravity gradient boom, Earth and
star sensors, a magnetometer, and a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver
and antennas.
. A Telemetry, Tracking, and Control (TT&C) and Command Data Handling
(CD&H) package requiring twenty megabits per second (20 Mbps) downlink
capability.
# Payloads consisting of a Long Wave Infrared (LWTR) Imager, X-Ray Imager,
Visible (VIS) Imager, Electron Spectrometer, and Dosimeter.
# Body mounted Silicon (Si) Solar cells on each of the cubic structure's faces.
Deployable/Fixed arrays. Six Solar arrays deploy to 30 degrees relative to the
spacecraft's longitudinal axis and then lock.
13
« Attitude knowledge of 0. 1 degree and accuracy of 1 .0 degree.
Following the AXIIS Concept Exploration (CE) brief in June, Space System
Engineering students in the AA 4871 Spacecraft Design II class were tasked with
evaluating the AXIIS design and producing a refined design for the Space Systems
Academic Group (SSAG) at NPS, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL), and spacecraft industry personnel.
In mid September 1999, the X-Ray Imager was deleted from the payload package
ofAXIIS and the program was renamed the Naval Postgraduate School Satellite or
NPSat. NPSat-1 would be the first in a series ofproposed modular bus satellites
designed, fabricated, and tested at NPS. Designing for a variety of scenarios in launch
vehicle environments, the vehicle targeted incurrence with the AXIIS report, was the
Pegasus.
The ADCS and TT&C packages remained basically unchanged with the exception
of the removal of the gravity gradient boom and minor modifications in the performance
of these subsystems. The Electrical Power System (EPS), Structure, Thermal, and
Mechanisms subsystems did change dramatically. For more details on the NPSat-
1
design refer to the NPSat- 1 Preliminary Design Report. The NPSat- 1 structure is
provided in Figure 2.
Figure 2. NPSat- 1 Deployed Solar Array Configuration.
(NPSat- 1 Preliminary Design Report).
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B. PROGRAM LENGTH
The originally scheduled launch date for the AXIIS was October 2003. This date
primarily reflected the timeline of the LWIR Imager. In addition, no schedule risk
management was conducted to control overruns. In an effort to more closely reflect our
planned schedule realistically, we addressed the risks involved in different portions of the
program and how these risk factors would translate into specific program element
durations. (Preliminary Design Report). The method used in doing this was via the
Monte Carlo technique discussed by Mr. Fred Raymond from the Naval Research
Laboratory in the September 1999 edition of Acquisition Defense Review Quarterly
(Raymond). Risk factors associated with the program schedule were applied and the
associated multipliers (Appendix B) were used to determine a realistic estimate. The
following risk attributes, per Mr. Raymond's article were used:
# Low-risk: Existing proven designs are used extensively; requirements are
well defined and readily achieved; development effort is minimal; and an
innovative approach materially simplifies design implementation. Extensive
use is made of proven hardware of software produced by previous suppliers;
exotic processes and tooling are not required for production; materials and
parts are readily available; and an innovative approach materially simplifies
production.
» Very High Risk: Extensive use is made of new and unproven designs;
requirements are poorly defined and unlikely to be achieved; development
effort is extensive; and an "innovative" approach materially complicates the
design.
• Moderate and High Risk: A grade of "moderate" or "high" is based on the
evaluators judgement, considering the risk extremes as defined for "low-risk"
and very high risk." Attributes will range from modification of existing
design of catalog design to new designs and high technology.
15
It should be noted, for the preliminary cost estimates and refined cost estimates
within this text, "confidence factors" vice risk factors were used for the Monte Carlo
applications. A high confidence factor equates to a low risk factor. This convention was
based solely on the judgement of the author and does not effect the eventual outcome of
the results. In addition to schedule risk management, the Monte Carlo technique was
used throughout the cost estimation process to account for the authors confidence in
initial estimates.
The Phase I program length was dictated by the start of the program through the
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). Since the PDR coincided with the end of the
Summer Quarter at NPS, the phase duration of 0.5 months was fairly concrete. The
duration of Phase II and Phase III durations came from inputs from Staff Engineers at
NPS, veterans o 4 the PANSAT program. They provided a wealth of information on
lessons learned i experiences from the PANSAT program. Even with this experience,
the NPSat-1 sp^ -craft would be a more complex satellite and it's program duration
would be longer than PANSAT. The Staff Engineers were solicited for their estimates of
the program length given a worksheet of basic tasks required to successfully complete the
Design and Development (D&D) for the PANSAT program. Fred Raymond's use of the
Monte. Carlo technique in calculating program durations was referenced and led to the
estimated duration for Phase II and Phase III listed in Table 1. (Preliminary Design
Report).
Phase Event Dates (MM/YY) Duration
1 Concept Exploration thru
Preliminary Design Review
3/99 - 9/99 0.5 Years
II PDR thru satellite launch 9/99-01/04 4.25 Years
111 Satellite launch thru on-orbit
operations (End of Life (EOL))
01/04-01/05 1.0 Years
Table 1. NPSat-1 Preliminary Program Schedule.
(NPSat-1 Preliminary Design Report).
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C. COST MODEL GUIDLINES
In the following paragraphs, the cost modeling approach used by the author
during the Preliminary Design Phase will be discussed. This approach is also discussed
in the Preliminary Design Report for the NPSat-1 spacecraft. Before we address the
approach, some ground rules and assumptions in the NPSat-1 cost analysis must be
explained:
, Cost Model results from the NAFCOM and SSCM software programs were
scaled down to reflect a university environment. Per Dr. Stephen Book,
Aerospace's expert on cost modeling, labor accounted for 85% of the overall
program cost from these models. The other 15% of the total was for hardware
costs only. Upon Dr. Book's recommendation, 35-55% of the 85% labor cost
would provide for a good baseline for a satellite program designed and
developed in a university environment. These values were based on Dr.
Book's engineering judgement and generic multiplication factors Aerospace
uses with university programs based on cost model versus actual expenditure
results. (Book).
.
Spacecraft spares, testing, and payload/bus integration are included in model
results.
# Student labor dedicated to the satellite is "free". Essentially, the use of
student labor is transparent to the actual cost for labor. However, through the
use of student labor, actual labor hours for staff engineers can be decreased
resulting in a decrease in overall labor costs. The "savings" realized with
student labor is debatable. An increase in student labor may have a significant
impact on the length of the program due to students' lack of expertise when
compared to staff engineers. For this reason, for the initial estimate, student
labor is not addressed as a method of saving dollars. There was no attempt to
increase the projected student labor hours to directly impact the overall
program cost for labor.
# Staff and faculty labor costs are direct costs only. There are no indirect
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charges included in this cost analysis for NPS staff and faculty personnel.
Indirect costs incorporate salary, overhead, and other miscellaneous fees. The
Indirect costs would be paid by companies requiring the services of NPS's
faculty and/or staff. Since there should be no instance where our personnel
are receiving compensation from outside resources, these costs are not
included.
Weighting factors for model complexity or NPS Cost Analyst unfamiliarity
with software packages were applied when required. The method for
accounting for the confidence in model data or analyst familiarity is the Monte
Carlo method of risk assessment. This method uses weighting factors to
provide a level of risk management for manipulating data. (Raymond). It
should be noted, the factors used provide for a minimum value for all risk
codes of 1.0. What this implies is the associated risk assessment will not
account for values which may be lower than the expected value. Per Mr.
Raymond, the reason for this is the initial estimate should be the "best guess."
In instances where there is no best guess, then it may require reducing the
Minimum multiplication factor to a value less than 1.0. (Raymond).
An assumed satellite mass of 150 kilograms (kg) is used for inputs into the
SSCM and NAFCOM models. This provided an additional mass margin of
approximately 15-25 kg to the existing mass margin calculated by the NPSat-
1 Student Structures Subsystem Manager. (Preliminary Design Report,
Appendix XI-II).
For labor hours, a 30% labor margin was used to provide for possible
underestimation. This was based solely on judgement by the author for his
lack of experience in cost analysis and from discussions with Dr. Book on the
historical underestimation of labor figures in cost estimates. This would have
no impact on the actual calculation of labor for Phase II due to the use of
ratios vice actual estimated hours. These ratios are Staff per Total hours,
Faculty per Total hours, and External Engineers per Total hours. Since all of
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these personnel divisions incorporate the same 30% margin, the value is
actually transparent in the ratio. Phase I and Phase III labor hours use the
actual values plus this margin calculated via the Labor Worksheets in the
Preliminary Design Report, Appendix III-4.
A 5% Management Reserve at the program level was instituted to provide a
margin within one standard deviation (CT) of the expected average cost for a
flight unit. This came to $1,285,473 FY 2003 dollars for out initial cost
analysis. As a comparison, the SNOE program had a Management Reserve
for their Phase II which equaled approximately $300,000 (Barth, SNOE Cost
information). It is not known what percentage this figure is of the SNOE
flight unit cost. It appears, due to the similarity between satellite mass and
mission for SNOE and NPSat-1, the 5% Management Reserve should more
than suffice for contingencies.
An additional year for on-orbit operations was included due to the high
likelihood the spacecraft would last at least two years on orbit vice one year
based on reliability calculations in the PDR report. This additional year of
operations would ensure the cost analysis provided for an extended program
life and would reflect the appropriate costs associated with added on-orbit
operations.
Payload costs are not included in the NAFCOM and SSCM software models
results. These values were calculated via the algorithm in Table 2.
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Step Procedure
1 Determine Model result: Program output was total labor and hardware costs tor Phase 11.
2 Labor with Single Contractor = Model result * 85%.
3 Labor lor University Environment = [Step 2 J * 30%.
4 Reduction factor tor In-house lesting = [Step 3 J * 30%.
5 Labor Subtotal = |Step 3 J - [Step 4J.
6 Determine miscellaneous labor expenses:
Maintenance = [Step 5] * 5%.
Overhead = [Step 5] * 10%.
Fees = [Step 5] * 5%.
General and Administrative (G&A) = [Step 5] * 5%.
7 Staff/ Faculty / Outside Contractor Labor = [Step 5] - £[Step 6].
8 Stall Labor Cost = [Step 7 J * Stall labor hour ratio 1 .
Faculty Labor Cost = [Step 7] * Faculty labor hour ratio.
Outside Contractor cost = [Step 7] * Outside Contractor labor hour ratio.
9 Stall Hours Reqmred = Stall Labor Cost / Stall hourly wage2 .
Faculty Hours Required = Faculty Labor Cost / Faculty hourly wage.
Outside Contractor Hours Required = Outside Contractor Cost / Contractor hourly wage.
10 Bus Cost (Materials and Labor) = [Step 1J - [Step 2J.
11 Bus Cost (Labor) = [Step 5J.
12 Total Bus Cost (Hardware/Matenals/Labor) = [Step 10J + [Step 1 1J.
13 Payload Cost = Expected Payload Cost * 1.30. (30% Margin).
14 Total Flight Umt Cost = [Step 12J + [Step 13J.
Notes: 1 Stall labor hour ratio is the ratio oi total stall labor hours lor Phase 11 in Appendix (C)
to total hours for Staff/Faculty/Outside Contractors in Phase II. Similarly for Faculty and
Outside Contractor.
2 Staff hourly wage based on current NPS Staff Engineer salary converted to FY2003S.
Similarly for Faculty and Outside Contractor.
Table 2. NPSat Phase II Cost Algorithm
D. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL INITIAL APPROACH
This section will discuss the initial approach for the NPSat cost model. This
approach for the cost analysis of the NPSat program was to use three different methods
for estimating satellite costs and then curve fit the results to give an estimation on the
price for each program phase. These methods were:
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1. CBS: Each subsystem manager would be responsible for acquiring vendor
quotes with Rough Order of Magnitudes (ROM) for each component and required spares
for their respective subsystem. Then, a "bottom-up" compilation of these costs would be
calculated to arrive at an estimate for spacecraft bus and payload hardware figures.
Labor expenditures would be determined via labor worksheets per program phase
completed by NPS staff engineers.
2. Cost modeling software: The NAFCOM and SSCM cost modeling programs
would be used for program cost estimation. SAIC provided training materials for their
NAFCOM model and a request for a copy of the SSCM model was sent to Aerospace
Corporation. Aerospace cost analysts provided one-on-one counseling with the author for
their SSCM and provided an advanced copy of this program. The NAFCOM model is
more complex than the Aerospace model and would require training to effectively reflect
expected expenditures. It should be noted, these two models only calculate the costs
associated with Design/Development, (D&D), manufacture, test, and launch. For the
NPSat, this would be Phase II: Critical Design through satellite launch. Concept
Exploration/Preliminary Design (Phase I), launch vehicle integration, Ground Support
Equipment (GSE), ground facility expenditures, and on-orbit operations (Phase III)
would not be included in the actual software data. This data would be calculated using
inputs from NPSat program management, the Space Systems Academic Group's (SSAG)
Administrator, Ms. Shawn Tribe, and staff engineers.
3. CERs: Preliminary rough cost estimates would be calculated by using the
CER parametric in mass provided in Equation (1-1). From this equation, with a projected
bus mass of approximately 150 kg, this equation resulted in a spacecraft bus cost of
$8,765,203 in Fiscal Year 1992 dollars (FY 1992$). Using the inflation factor conversion
table, Table (20-1) of Wertz and Larson's "Spacecraft Mission Analysis and Design"
(SMAD), this resulted in a bus cost of $12,367,701 (FY 2003$). After reviewing
"Reducing Space Mission Cost", the decision was made to discard the use of this
parametric due to historical data which indicated the CER relationships usually resulted
in an over-inflated cost estimate for small satellites. ("Reducing Space Mission Cost",
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Fig. 8-9). The primary reason for the CER's inaccuracy is sampled data which was used
to establish the parametric equation was based on large, expensive satellite programs
which do not take into account small satellite program philosophy: build versus buy,
maximization of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components, reduction of program
length, and increased in-house testing. In contrast, the SSCM's historical performance
closely mirrored estimated small spacecraft program costs with their actual program
expenditures. This resulted in the use of only the CBS, SSCM, and NAFCOM models
and ideally reduced the likelihood of an overestimation of cost. In hindsight, the CER in
Equation (1-1) was fairly accurate if compared with the computer model results and
inputs from industry experts from the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL).
E. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL ACTUAL APPROACH
The actual approach used for the preliminary cost estimate of NPSat-1 consisted
of the following:
1. CBS: The "bottom-up" CBS component ROM estimates fairly closely
resembled the actual flight unit hardware figures calculated in the SSCM and NAFCOM
programs. However, there was no suitable means to determine labor expenses. We
overcame this dilemma by applying the SSCM and NAFCOM labor calculation discussed
in Table 2 in reverse. Cost Breakdown Structure values are provided in Appendix (A).
2. SSCM: There were actually two results from this software package: One
from Aerospace Corporations Cost Analysts and one from a model performed by using
acquired SSCM software by the author. (Aerospace Meeting). The SSCM, as discussed
earlier, result was for Phase II hardware and labor. In order to breakout actual labor
hours and expenses, bus cost, and total flight unit cost, the algorithm provided below in
Table 2 was used for Phase II values with the concurrence of Dr. Book on the spreadsheet
calculations provided in Appendix (C). (Book).
3. NAFCOM: SAIC's Cost model was used to provide an alternate computer
software source for the cost analysis. This program is used routinely by NASA and
USAF satellite systems engineers. A more complex model than SSCM, NAFCOM
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provides additional features for operator induced filters to more accurately perform a
comparison with the inherent satellite database. These additional features did contribute
to the complexity for the first time user and essentially require professional software
training from SAIC or personnel who are very familiar with this software. Due to the
time limitations in the Preliminary Design Phase, the author opted to account for this
complexity via risk factors in the Monte Carlo method. In addition, the author attended a
one-day training course at SAIC offices in Huntsville, AL to ensure this unfamiliarity
dilemma was alleviated. Although this training was conducted after the initial cost
estimate for NPSat, it would prove beneficial for the refined model discussed later in this
document. The algorithm listed in Table 2 is compatible with the results from the
NAFCOM model.
F. NPSAT-1 COST MODEL RESULTS
Figure 3 illustrates the results of the different methods of modeling with their
average. It reflects all costs associated with the development ofNPSat for Phase II of the
program schedule. It should be reinforced, all model results were evaluated on the
complexity of their software and the familiarity of the analyst then input into a Monte
Carlo risk assessment subroutine then averaged. (App. B). Also, the Aerospace (NPS)
result was attained via an on-site brief from Aerospace personnel at their office in El
Segundo, CA and then executed by the author. In Figure 3, notice the model performed
by the author is significantly higher than other cost modeling approaches. The primary
reason for this gap from the other results is due to an under-confidence in the analyst's
knowledge of the software. The Monte Carlo confidence level "High" was used and
when compared to a confidence factor of "High+", the actual Flight Unit cost is













Figure 3. NPSat-1 Flight Unit Cost Comparison.
From these Phase II figures and the algorithm in Table 2, labor hours, labor
dollars, and the number of engineering personnel were calculated. Phase I data was
easily calculated since this phase covered from Concept Exploration through the actual
delivery of the PDR report which coincided with the end of the Summer Quarter at NPS.
Actual expense information was provided by Ms. Shawn Tribe, the Administrator for the
SSAG, and estimated labor hours were used to arrive at Phase I data that was fairly
accurate. Phase III calculations required the use of the Labor Worksheets completed by
staff engineers and expected ground facility and operational expenditures. LCDR Tim
Anderson was consulted due to his expertise in Operational and Administrative (O&A)
cost factors. As a former analyst at the Navy Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) and a
recognized expert at NPS in cost, probability, and risk, he provided a list of expected
O&A expenditures which was used in conjunction with the Labor Worksheets to arrive at
the expected cost data for Phase III. Figure 4 reflects the expected costs for labor for each
phase of the NPSat-1 program.
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Figure 4. NPSat Labor Dollars Required.
Notice from the data in Figure 4, NPS student labor dollars are not displayed due
to our initial ground rule of "free" student labor. The expected labor hours and resultant
dollar figure are based on 1500 working hours per year. In addition, the specific hourly
wages per type of personnel were $30/hr for staff engineers, $50/hr for faculty, and
$70/hr for external engineering personnel. For external personnel, an hourly wage of $50
was used with an additional 40% for indirect costs (overhead and G&A) resulting in a
rate of $70/hour in FY 2003 dollars. These indirect costs were based on engineering
judgement and will be discussed later in this paper.
Figures 5 and 6 depict the resultant labor hours and number of personnel,
respectively. The Figure 5 values were determined from the algorithm discussed in
Table 2. From these derived values and from the above mentioned wage rates, the data
for Figure 6 was obtained. The number of personnel required was calculated via the
known program length with additional schedule margin of 90 days and the projected
















Figure 5. NPSat- 1 Labor Hours Required.














Figure 6. NPSat- 1 Number of Personnel Required.
In Figure 6, notice the number of students required is included in the graph.
Although there were no labor dollar figures associated with student labor in Figure 4 and
no established method of determining the "cost" for a military officer student (the
majority of students at NPS are U.S. Military personnel), the labor worksheets accounted
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for the projected number of students per specific task. These details are provided in
Appendix (C).
Once the projected expenditure figures were compiled, the process and actual
results were reviewed by LCDR Tim Anderson. He pointed out the necessity for
reflecting the probability of realizing these numbers for NPSat Program Management.
Figure 7, shows the probability distribution for each Flight Unit cost model projected
result from the values previously illustrated in Figure 3.









$ 1 0. 1 -$ 1 3. 1 M [65% Probability]
$8. 7- 1 4. 5 M [95% Probability]
Figure 7. NPSat- 1 Flight Unit Cost Probability Distribution.
An itemized list of total NPSat program costs is shown in Figure 8. In addition,
the associated expenditures for launch vehicle integration, ground support equipment, and
management reserves are included in the diagram. The management reserve is within












Figure 8. Program Cost per Phase.
calculated values discussed thus far reflected a risk assessment via the Monte Carlo
technique.
Ground Support equipment data was calculated through discussions with staff
engineers on expected prices for non-flying components essential for the testing and
evaluation of actual component which would be integrated into the spacecraft.
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III. COMPARISON OF NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL SPACECRAFT
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES AND FACILITIES WITH
STANFORD UNIVERSITY CAPABILITIES
A. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL SPACE SYSTEM DESIGN AND
DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES
As a result of the PANSAT program, the Naval Postgraduate School has emerged
as a viable institution for the design and development of small satellites for commercial
and military applications. The facilities and equipment dedicated to the development of
satellites at NPS consist of the following:
• High precision automated Machining Center (Fig. 9): Vertical Mill, Lathe,
0.0002-inch repeatability, and 20-position automatic tool changer. Performs
complex shapes and contours and allows for unique parts fabrication.
Figure 9. NPS Machining Center
Soft-walled Clean Room (Fig. 10): Class 10,000. 12' x 10' x 8' (height).
Figure 10. NPS Clean Room.
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• Laminar flow bench (clean environment) and Vacuum Oven (Fig. 11):
Flow Bench
Figure 11. NPS Laminar Flow Bench and Vacuum Oven.
Thermal-Vacuum Chamber (Fig. 12): Temperature control range of -73°C to
+ 177°C. One cubic foot test volume. Vacuum up to 7.5 x 10"8 Torr. Viewing
port and multiple pin connector for in-situ testing.
Figure 12. NPS Thermal-Vacuum Chamber.
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Shaker System (Fig. 13): 465 pounds force (Maximum). 93 g's acceleration
(Maximum). 1.0 inch double-amplitude displacement. DC - 3.0 kHz
frequency range.
Figure 13. NPS Shaker System
• Radio Frequency Shielded Enclosure (Fig. 14): 10' x 8' x 8' (height).
Attenuation of 14 kHz (Magnetic) at 60dB, 50 MHz (Electric) at 100 dB, and
10 GHz (Plane Wave / Microwave) at 100 dB.
Figure 14. RF Shielded Enclosure.
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• Electronic Test Equipment (Fig. 15): RF testing, Functional testing, In-circuit
emulator, and LabView (Test Control).
Figure 15. Electronic Test Equipment
• Solar Simulator (Fig. 16): The Solar Simulator 1000 provides equivalent AMO
light in a controlled environment. ,''
Figure 16. Solar Simulator
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• Satellite Operations (Fig. 17): NPS Ground Operations Center provides Staff,
Faculty, and Students an interface to satellites on-orbit.
Figure 17. NPS Ground Operations
In addition to the facilities and equipment available for satellite D&D, the
following personnel are permanent staff members to the NPS satellite design lab and
veterans of the PANSAT program:
• One Aerospace Engineer with experience in systems engineering, structures,
mechanical design, orbitology, and vibration/dynamics testing.
• One Computer Engineer with experience in embedded software design, digital
logic design, ground station control design, and expertise in C, Assembly,
LabView, and Matlab.
• One Electronics Engineer with experience in satellite power electronics,
battery design, circuits design (digital and analog), and expertise in C and
Matlab.
• One Senior Electronics Engineer Technician with experience in RF
communications design, digital logic design, and analog electronics design.
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B. STANFORD UNIVERSITY SPACE SYSTEM DESIGN CAPABILITIES
AND COMPLETED PROGRAMS
The Stanford University Space Systems Design Lab (SSDL) in Palo Alto, CA was
toured in October 1999 by the author. Dr. Robert Twiggs demonstrated the capabilities
of the SSDL and discussed the process by which Stanford students design, fabricate, and
test their spacecraft. Although Stanford does not have any satellite engineers on staff, it
does utilize the labor of Doctoral, Graduate, and Undergraduate students. (Twiggs
Interview). The facilities used for satellite design and development are provided in the
figures below (SSDL Homepage):
Figure 18. Stanford Clean-Room. Figure 19. Stanford Main Lab.
Figure 20. Stanford Ground Station.
Stanford's impressive ability to design satellites is highly dependent on the
ingenuity of it's undergraduate and graduate students with the added assistance of
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spacecraft industry "mentors". These mentors meet with students throughout the design
effort to provide recommendations to improve the design or to address problem areas
encountered during the process. The key to Stanford's success is simplicity of design and
spacecraft missions that provide faculty and staff with reasonable objectives and can be
incorporated into small buses usually less than 50 kilograms. Examples of this success
are the Stanford AudioPhonic PHotographic InfraRed Experiment (SAPPHIRE) and the
Orbiting Picosatellite Automatic Launcher (OPAL).
SAPPHIRE was Stanford's first student built microsatellite which was completed
on July 10, 1998. It emphasizes simple designs, reasonable objectives, short mission
timelines, and the use of COTS equipment to minimize costs. (Twiggs). Students used
plywood prototypes constructed via machining equipment on-site and standard power
tools. Then the hexagonal structure was fabricated out of honeycomb aluminum. The
instruments incorporated into the design were digital camera and voice synthesizer with a
virtual sun sensor for a student telemetry experiment and a beacon-based health
monitoring system experiment. The spacecraft uses passive magnetic stabilization with
permanent magnets mounted to point the camera towards Earth. (SAPPHIRE). Figure
21, shows the SAPPHIRE spacecraft.
Figure 21. SAPPHIRE Spacecraft. (SAPPHIRE Homepage).
Table 3 shows specific program labor elements.
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Program Labor Hours (Thousands)
^FX
Personnel Used (for entire program)
Faculty
Doctoral Students ~9^"
Masters Students "83T ~5T
Undergrad Students ~9T6~
External Engineers / Advisors 7T
Note: There may be cases where the same person is used in different phases, however, not enough
information is available to break this out in the Personnel field.
Table 3. SAPPHIRE Labor. (SAPPHIRE Cost Estimation Template).
T5"
Program length for SAPPHIRE was approximately 4.0 years. Spacecraft
hardware and materials cost was approximately $45,000 with payload integration,
overhead, and consulting included in this figure. Total labor hours equated to
approximately 1 14,000 hours for the life of the program.
The OPAL satellite's mission is to demonstrate the feasibility of launching
multiple picosatellites from a mothership satellite. OPAL is still awaiting a launch date.
The picosatellite launcher ports are in the middle of the picture in Figure 22. Secondary
payloads consist of an accelerometer testbed and a magnetometer testbed. Design
commenced in early April 1995 with an expected launch to be determined. With a mass
of 13.5 kg, this satellite used COTS equipment for batteries, processors, communications,
etc. (OPAL). Table 4 shows the labor elements for OPAL. The OPAL spacecraft is
pictured in Figure 22.
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Figure 22. OPAL outside Stanford's Durand Building during Student Testing.
(OPAL Homepage).
Program Labor Hours (Thousands) Personnel Used (for entire program)
Faculty 4.8 3
Doctoral Students 9.6 6
Masters Students 86.4 54
Undergrad Students 9.6 6
External Engineers / Advisors 7.2 15
Note: There may be cases where the same person is used in different phases, however, not enough
information available to break this out in the Personnel field.
Table 4. OPAL Labor. (OPAL Cost Estimation Template).
Stanford's costs for the OPAL satellite equated to approximately $40,000 with an
additional $250,000 donated from other agencies. Total labor hours required were
approximately 117,600 hours. Amount donated to the SAPPHIRE program is not
available. Scheduled launch date for OPAL is December 7, 1999. (OPAL Homepage).
Satellite testing performed on-site at the SSDL for these two missions consisted
of: ambient thermal, shake, and solar simulation for the solar panels.
37

The advantage of Stanford's simplistic design philosophy for satellites, as Dr
Twiggs explained, allows students the ability to learn aspects of spacecraft applied to an
actual design. (Twiggs Interview). If we compared the typical Stanford student's
curriculum length with that of a NPS student, we would see, the Stanford student will be
on campus for a minimum of three to four years. Unfortunately, the NPS Space
Engineering or Operations student can expect a maximum of two and a half years. It
would be ideal for NPS students to also have the luxury of applying what they learn in
class on an actual satellite mission. However, this would require a reevaluation of our
satellite design philosophy and would probably require additional program lengths for
satellites similar to OPAL and SAPPHIRE in mission and size. There are some lessons
learned which can be applied immediately:
, Advisors: Dr. Twiggs indicated the use of industry mentors has provided
benefits of sound engineering advice at a minimal cost. Granted, they do not
have on staff engineers as NPS, however, the addition of a mentorship
program here at NPS would provide an added source of expertise which could
help ease some of our staff engineering hours. (Twiggs Interview).
• Smaller Satellites: Stanford limits it's spacecraft to missions which can be
successfully accomplished by smaller satellites (less than 50kg). From David
Bearden's Dissertation on "A Methodology for Spacecraft Technology
Insertion Analysis Balancing Benefit, Cost, and Risk", modern small satellite
trends of mass versus cost are approximately $40K/lb in FY 1994 dollars.
(Bearden, p. 15, Fig. 2-2). Obviously, the smaller the mass, the lower our
expected costs and necessity for a more simple mission. This fact could serve
us well here at NPS if we attempt to limit the scope of our missions so we can
provide a viable mission with a D&D length within a typical Space Operations
or Engineering student tenure of 2.0-2.5 years.
• Donated parts: Any part donated by industry is one less you will have to buy.
We must strive to solicit industry for donated parts or labor to reduce cost.
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Commercial-Off-The-Shelf versus Risk: Dr Twiggs indicated the use of
COTS versus space rated components does provide some risk in the success of
the mission. However, he pointed out, as an educational institution, if the
mission fails, what has been lost? (Twiggs Interview). The students had the
ability to apply theory to actual design, so is there any actual loss? Granted, if
a program uses donated parts in it's design this might not be acceptable to the
corporation providing these components. This must be carefully covered in
the concept exploration phase to ensure the actual mission is brought to the
attention of industry: The successful design and development of a satellite,
not necessarily the successful completion of the mission. This should
preclude any difficulties in the later phases of the program. Is NPS willing to
adapt to this philosophy? This question currently remains unanswered.
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IV. THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL COST MODEL
A. NPS COST MODEL METHODS
The NPS Cost Model is strictly for cost analysis for satellites designed and
developed at the Naval Postgraduate School. A Microsoft Excel based program, this
model uses the Cost Breakdown Structure of a satellite, NAFCOM, and SSCM software
results as inputs to the program. The inputs are processed through an algorithm which
calculates the following:
Estimated program duration.
Expected number of personnel required for program.
Estimated labor hours for program.
Estimated labor dollars for program.
Estimated hardware costs.
Estimated Management Reserves.
Estimated Overhead, G&A, and Fees.
Cost per program phase.
Cost for one flight unit.
Total program cost estimate.
Probability of the cost of one flight unit.
Total program cost spreader.
Charts for: labor (hours), labor (dollars), number of personnel, probability for
cost of one flight unit, fiscal year cost distribution, and total programmatic
costs. (App. E).
From this information, the NPS Program Manager can arrive at a cost estimate for
the program with adjusted values resultant from a risk assessment performed in the NPS
Model. However, the actual cost, or how much NPS will have to pay to realize the
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satellite program are not calculated. The "price" of any program will depend on many
variables which cannot be calculated via one program. For instance, donated
components, labor, etc., cannot be accounted for but do have a tremendous impact on
how much NPS will have to pay. The NPS Cost Model will be useful during the initial
phases of a spacecraft program to perform preliminary cost estimates.
The following inputs are required for the NPS Cost Model (App. D):
• SSCM and NAFCOM resultant total program cost. CBS for satellite bus
hardware and spares is also entered in the model. Risk assessment or
"Confidence" ratings are also required by the operator on these values to
provide risk management.
• Expected program durations and confidence ratings for Phases I, II, and III.
.
Expected labor hours for each phase from Labor Worksheets similar to those
in the Preliminary Design Report with associated confidence ratings.
(Preliminary Design Report, Appendix III-4). These worksheets are supplied
in the NPS Cost Model in spreadsheet form.
s Expected personnel salaries in FY 2003 dollars. No confidence ratings are
required in this section. Due to the availability of actual salaries it was
deemed confidence ratings would not be required.
• Phase III (Post-Launch) other dollar confidence rating. Currently the model
assumes 70% for Hardware, Materials, and Supplies, 20% for General and
Administrative, Fees, and Maintenance, and 10% for Overhead. These ratios
are assumed on a total "Other dollars" total of $50,000 per year for on-orbit
operations. This figure was used from discussions with NPS Staff Engineers
on expected values for operations. Ideally, the best method for determining
this factor would have been to analyze the PANSAT program costs for
operations. However, due to the lack of information and the inherent
differences of the PANSAT and NPSat programs, there was no concrete
method of determining expected operational costs. In addition, there was a
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lack of comparison data from on-orbit or successful mission programs which
closely resembled NPSat. At this juncture, the $50,000 hypothesis seems well
within reason and could be fine tuned in future analysis. Due to the lack of
concrete data on operational expenditures expected, these ratios are processed
through the Monte Carlo technique via the input confidence ratings for this
section.
There were several factors which were determined to be incorrect in the NPSAT-
1
Cost Model. The following areas were noted and corrected in the NPS Cost Model:
, In the NPSat- 1 cost analysis, labor hours were not processed through the
Monte Carlo technique. In addition, a 30% underestimation margin was used
an added to each personnel category to arrive at the total labor hours for staff,
faculty, external engineers, and engineers. After discussions with Dr. Stephen
Book, it was revealed the majority of labor hour estimations are significantly
lower than the actual labor hours incurred during the life of a satellite
program. For this reason, the author instituted this 30% labor margin as a
means to ensure adequate risk management. However, from the Labor
Worksheets in the Preliminary Design Report of these total corrected values
were not used in the actual labor calculations for Phase I. In addition, none of
the labor values from the Preliminary Design Report were processed through
the Monte Carlo method. (Preliminary Design Report, App. III-4). This was
corrected in the NPS Model to allow for sufficient risk management. Specific
new labor values will be discussed later in the Refinement of NPSat- 1 Cost
Analysis via the NPS Cost Model, Chapter IV, Section B of this paper.
, NPSat- 1 analysis labor ratios for the calculation of Phase II labor were
incorrect. (Preliminary Design Report, App. III-4). The Phase II values in the
Preliminary Design Report Appendix III-4 show Staff Labor of 55% of the
total labor, Faculty Labor at 10%, and External Labor at 35% of total labor.
This is incorrect. From the Labor Worksheets of this same appendix of the
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report, after calculating the ratios of Staff Labor hours / Total Labor hours,
Faculty Labor hours / Total Labor hours, Student Labor hours / Total Labor
hors, and External Labor hours / Total Labor hours, you arrive at a Staff labor
ratio of 60%, Faculty ratio of 8%, Student ratio of 30% and External Engineer
ration of 2%. Also, as discussed above, Student Labor dollars were not
calculated in the NPSat-1 analysis. This was corrected in the NPS Model by
an automatic calculation from the Labor Worksheets which applied the exact
ratios per personnel category to the Labor total to arrive at each cost.
The number ofwork hours available to each category per year for the NPSat-1
cost analysis was 1,960. After discussion with the NPSat-1 Program
Manager, Professor Richard Harkins, Jan Young, the NPS Naval Air Forces
(NAVAIR) Chair, and Dean Netzer of the NPS Research Department, this
was reduced to a more reasonable level of yearly labor for each personnel
category of 1500 hours for the NPS Model. In addition, since the NPS Model
now used Student Labor as a parameter, an associated yearly hour estimate for
a typical student was required. The chosen value of 500 hours / year / student
was selected after discussions with NPS Staff Engineers on their experiences
with student assistance (thesis work) from the PANSAT program and from
input by the NPSat-1 Program Manager. Typically, a thesis student requires
a period of training on the particular subsystem and it's integration within the
satellite system. The Staff Engineers indicated the ratio of productive labor
hours for Staff-to-Student is approximately 3 to 1. This ratio takes into
account the students training time and coursework not directly related to his or
her thesis. This means one Staff Engineer hour equals three Student hours.
With our use of 1500 hours as the effective work hours per year per. Staff
Engineer, and using this 3:1 ratio, we arrive at 500 hours per year per Student.
If we analyze the 500 Student hours an alternate method, we can assume the
student can only contribute during the last two quarters of the curriculum, then
in 24 weeks, assuming 4 hours per day, 5 days a week, the student can provide
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480 hours per year. Of course, this value does not include the training time
required to ensure productivity. So, the 500 hours, is a good estimate for what
can be expected as Student Labor available per year. This value should
provide a solid basis from which to derive the number of students required for
each particular phase of the satellite program. Additional research in this area
is required to more accurately reflect the expected number of labor hours one
student can contribute to the development effort.
The NPS Cost Model should provide Staff and Management personnel a flexible
and user-friendly tool for estimating the cost of a satellite program. Launch Vehicle costs
and Launch Vehicle Integration costs are not calculated in this model. There are too
many variable and too numerous launch vehicles to effectively provide a calculation for
these expenditures.
B. REFINEMENT OF NPSAT-1 COST ANALYSIS
After completion of the design of the NPS Cost Model, the author performed
another analysis of the NPSat-1 program through this model. The exact numbers for the
Aerospace, NAFCOM, and Cost Breakdown Structure results were used as inputs. In
addition, all the above stated required inputs for the NPS Cost Model were supplied from
the initial cost analysis. (Preliminary Design Report). The changes incorporated into this
analysis were the following:
s Labor: The Program Manager and Staff Engineers were once again consulted
to review and refine the initial Labor Worksheets. (App. D, pp. 1-3). The
resultant labor values are listed in Table 5. For Phases I and III, labor hours
are calculated directly from the Labor Worksheets. Phase II uses the
algorithm in Table 1 to determine labor hours. From Table 5, Phases I and IE
remain relatively unchanged. Highlighted values indicate significant changes
from the original estimate. However, if we observe the labor hours for Phase
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II, there is a dramatic decrease in the required labor for this phase. There are a
couple of contributing factors to this decrease:
1. The labor ratios discussed earlier in this paper for the initial model
were incorrect. After recalculating these values, the original ratios did
not actually reflect the ratio of the specific personnel cost per total
cost. This value is crucial to determine the number of labor hours.
This discrepancy was corrected in the NPS Cost Model.
2. The wage for each personnel category was significantly different
between the preliminary analysis and the final model. This was due to
the use of direct costs only, or "base" salaries for Staff, Faculty, and
External personnel of $30/hr, $50/hr, and $70/hr, respectively. In our
algorithm labor hours are determined by dividing the personnel
category labor dollars by the appropriate wage. For our NPS Cost
Model analysis, we used the Indirect Costs and Accelerated Costs in
addition to the base salary. Significantly higher wages of $65/hr for
Staff, $129/hr for Faculty, and $129/hr for External. When these
numbers are used as the divisor, there is a noticeable decrease in the
required hours. Basically, in the initial model, our labor hours are less
"expensive" than what is typically charged by the university and
industry.
3. The initial model dollars were processed through our risk assessment
methodology in addition to our wages. We then used these risk
corrected values to calculate the number of labor hours. Keep in mind,
these labor hours are now "risk assessed". We then took these labor
hours and processed them through the Monte Carlo matrix. This is
incorrect. The risk assessment on our resultant value had already been
accomplished via the model dollars and wages. Essentially, we
misused the Monte Carlo matrix resulting in more elevated values.
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Preliminary Design Report
Labor Hours (In Thousands)
NPS COST MODEL
Labor Hours (In Thousands)
Phase Staff Faculty External Students Staff Faculty External Students
I 1.23 0.27 0.0 3.91 1.32 0.285 0.0 3.74
II 71.82 8.71 26.1 20.4 51.06 5.41 1.14 25.6
III 14.48 5.33 7.80 8.84 14.86 5.73 8.66 8.66
lable5. Cc•mpanson oi PDR and NPS Cost Model Estimates tor Labor.
Staff and Faculty wages: The wages used for NPS Staff and Faculty in the
preliminary cost analysis do not account for indirect costs and accelerated
labor costs. This was part of the ground rules from the estimate listed in the
Preliminary Design Report. This is incorrect. In order to accurately account
for all dollars associated with labor, the indirect and accelerated costs must be
incorporated. This is due to the fact that the SSCM and NAFCOM models
account for these figures and therefore, the resultant program cost will be
higher. In order to accurately reflect labor, the author met with the Dean of
Research at NPS, David Netzer and discussed these issues. The "price" of
using NPS Faculty members is these Indirect costs added to the Accelerated
costs. Indirect costs are recovered for administrative and facilities support and
Accelerated labor costs incorporate leave and fringe benefits for Faculty and
Staff personnel. Dean Netzer revealed for costing purposes for prospective
research by NPS solicited by outside agencies, NPS assumes an average base
salary of $100,000 per year for Faculty and $36,000 for Staff. However, the
Staff salary is for administrative personnel. Actual Staff Engineer base
salaries average approximately $50,000 per year, per Ms. Shawn Tribe of the
Space Systems Academic Group at NPS. The base salary for these engineers
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was used vice the staff (administrative) values. The basis for using the higher
value is the fact that the majority of staff labor dollars expended will be for
these engineers. From this point forward, we will assume "Staff wages refer
to the engineer associated wages
,
unless specifically denoted otherwise. The
actual labor cost is determined by adding the total of Accelerated labor and
Indirect Labor to these averages. The "charged" Indirect costs are 28% of the
base salary and Accelerated costs are 43% of the base. (Memoranda 1 and 2).
The result is a yearly wage of $100,000 * 1.71 for Faculty and $50,000 * 1.71
for Staff members. This yields Faculty and Staff yearly wages of $171,000
and $85,500, respectively. In addition, from our discussion, Dean Netzer
revealed NPS assumes 214 available work days per year with eight hours per
day of labor yielding 1,720 hours per year. There are 260 workdays in the year
if we exclude Saturdays and Sundays. Of these possible workdays, NPS
assumes 44 are leave, holiday, etc., yielding 214 actual workdays. The initial
NPS model assumed 1,960 hours per year with Staff wages of $30/hour and
Faculty wages of $50/hour. Upon the author's judgement and with
concurrence of the NPSat Program Manger, this was corrected in the NPS
Model to 1,500 hours per year to account for worst case. Using these values
this yields hourly wages for Faculty and Staff of $114/hour and $57/hour in
FY 1999 dollars, respectively. Providing for inflation to FY 2003 dollars, the
wages are $129/hour for Faculty and $65/hour for Staff. It is assumed
External wages are relatively equal to Faculty wages and Student wages for a
junior grade military officer are similar to the Staff (administrative) wages.
At $36,000 / year in FY 1999$, multiplied by our Accelerated and Indirect
Costs factor of 1.71, this yields a value of $61,560. This value divided by our
assumed hours of 1,500 yields a wage in FY 1999 dollars of $41 /hi. Inflated
to FY2003$, we arrive at $46 / hr for Students.
Other Dollars: In the initial estimate, Fees, Overhead, General and
Administrative costs for supplies and facilities were not realistic with current
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figures in the industry. From the NAFCOM model, Contingency
(Management Reserve), Program Support (facilities, supplies, support
personnel), and Fees can be calculated for each specific cost model. This
feature was not used in the initial or the final estimates, but for follow on
models is highly recommended. These "other dollars" typically account for
15-30%, 5-10%, and 10-15%, respectively, of the Phase II dollars (NAFCOM
model, Systems Engineering section). Applying these ratios to the
preliminary model we arrive at "other dollars" of approximately $5.0 million.
However, if we look at our calculations used in the initial model for NPSat,
the "other dollars" equate to approximately $1.2 million, or $3.8 million
below what SAIC corporation recommends for these expenditures
(Preliminary Design Report, Appendix III-4). In the refined model with the
"new" wages for NPS personnel and External engineers, the applied ratios for
"other dollars" come to approximately $2.2 million. Still short of what we
should typically expect in industry. However, since these "new" wages now
include some of the "other dollars" with the addition of Indirect and
Accelerated costs, a noticeable total labor dollar increase is noticed in the
realm of $2.9 million. Adding these two figures gives us a total other dollar
figure of approximately $5.1 millions which is more realistic (App. E).
Monte Carlo technique: Transparent to the observer, in the initial estimate for
NPSat, there were instances when hypothesized values were run through the
Monte Carlo technique twice (Preliminary Design Report, Appendix III-4).
Essentially this results in an extra multiplication factor which is exaggerated
for lower confidence values. This is an incorrect use of the Monte Carlo
method and could result in an overestimation. This was corrected in the NPS
Cost Model to ensure if two different categories of estimates were used for a
calculation, the resultant was not processed through the Monte Carlo matrix.
It is inherent in the technique that if values X and Y are used in a calculation
Z which is a function of these X and Y values, and X and Y are analyzed for
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risk factors, then the resultant value Z will already have an integrated risk
correction. In the first cost estimation for NPSat, the resultant value Z,
already corrected for risk, was then processed through the Monte Carlo
matrix. Specific equations which used this incorrect technique are in the
Preliminary Design Report, Appendix III-4, Phase III. In addition, the
question was raised by Jan Young as to the validity of using a Minimum
multiplication factor for all confidence ratings of 1.0. Ms. Young's question
stemmed from the fact that these multiplication factors would not prevent an
overestimation. Basically, should the initial estimate on some value be a
"worst case" value, then the Minimum multiplication factor would not allow
for the case in which the initial estimate was actually higher than the actual
result. (Young Interview). From correspondence with Fred Raymond, he
explained the initial "guess" for values should be the "best case." If this is the
case, then the likelihood of overestimation is minimized which should
alleviate the requirement for a Minimum multiplication factor less than 1.0.
Student Labor: Student Labor was determined to be "free" in the initial cost
estimate. It could be debated this is not actually correct. Some accounting of
cost for the effort students exert into all program phases should be performed.
For the Refined Model, Student Labor was again essentially "free", however a
different approach was used to demonstrate this idea. Student salaries were
equated with Staff salaries and included benefits as noted in our discussion of
Accelerated and Indirect Costs. These wages were used to calculate the cost
of this labor for the duration of the program and then subtracted from the
overall total labor dollars required to indicate the perceived "price" of the
student labor from a budget standpoint. Basically, NPS will not have to pay
students to work on the satellite, so the "price" of their effort is essentially
"free."
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• External Labor: Due to proprietary information, an average value from
different satellite corporations for engineer wages was unobtainable, so the
author used an equivalent value to the cost of Faculty labor which did not
seem unrealistic. This value, $129/hour FY 2003, was deemed appropriate by
Aerospace and NAFCOM cost analysts. (NAFCOM Training Course and
Book Interview).
• Fiscal Year Cost Distribution: A new feature incorporate into the NPS Cost
Model, this distribution is generated via the Navy Center for Cost Analysis'
(NCCA) "Inflation Indices and Outlay Profile Factors" for Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation for Phases II and III. This document was
supplied by Tim Anderson after he was consulted on a possible method of
implementing a cost spreader. The requirement for a cost spreading technique
was generated after Professor Chris Olsen's request for a breakout of dollars
per phase. Initially, the method used by SAIC corporation via a Beta
Distribution was chosen as a possible candidate method. Tara Clayborn of
SAIC provided the "Funding Allocation Tables and Beta Distribution
Estimating Software" handbook as a reference. The software program
referenced in this handbook is used by NASA personnel for "cost spreading"
their satellite programs. Tim Anderson suggested the use of the Navy's
method via the NCCA's document discussed above. The use of this method
vice the beta distribution was based on the likelihood the NPSat program
would be funded by the Department of the Navy. In hindsight, the use of both
of these methods would have provided a more robust reference for
determining the anticipated costs per fiscal year.
The NPS Cost Model developed by the author was used for the refined cost
analysis for NPSat- 1 with the following highlights listed in Table 6.
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All Dollars FY 2003 Initial Model Finai Model
Spacecraft Bus $4,176,856 $3,633,828
Spacecraft Payload $440,700 $440,700
Labor 1 $8,252,235 $6,835,743
Other Dollars (Fees, Overhead, etc.) $127,173 $2,190,744
Ground Support bquipment $282,500 $282,500
Management Reserve (5% ot Fit Unit) $1,285,473 $756,600
hxpected Program Cost (not including
Launch Vehicle & LV integration).
$14,564,937 $14,140,115
'Labor does not include cost ot Student labor. This tigure has already been subtracted out.
Table 6. Initial Versus Final Model Program Costs
If we notice the Spacecraft Bus cost, the NPS Cost Model resulted in a Bus cost
actually lower than the original estimate. This was due to multiple uses of the Monte
Carlo matrix in the original model. As discussed earlier, this was not necessary, and
obviously contributed to a higher forecast cost for the spacecraft's bus.
In addition to these values, the following Tables depict the expected cost of labor
or Labor Dollars (Table 7), and Personnel required (Table 8) compared with the initial
NPSat-1 model performed during the preliminary design.
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Labor Dollars
(FY 2003 Dollars K)
Initial Model Final Model
PHASES I II HI I 11 Ill
Staff 26.6 2,706.0 478 85.71 3,318.6 966.1
Faculty 12.8 492.0 309 36.78 439.23 725.97
External Engineers 1,722.0 406 146.41 1,116.9
Students 1 NA NA NA 171.93 1,178.2 398.27
Total 39.4 4920 1193 294.42 5,082.4 3,207.2
1 Student Labor Dollars were not calculated in the initial model tor Phase J1,11, and 111.
Table 7. initial Model Versus Final Model Labor Dollars.
In Table 7 above, notice the dramatic increase in expected labor dollars for the
Final Model. This is primarily due to the inclusion of Student Labor dollar figures and
the "new" addition of Indirect Costs and Accelerated costs in the final estimate.
Personnel Required Initial Model Final Model
PHASES 1 TI Tn I 11 III
Staff 0.63 8.67 7.0 1.64 6.79 4.25
Faculty 0.18 1.0 0.5 0.36 0.45 1.61
External Engineers 2.0 3.0 0.15 2.47
Students 1 15 32.4 19.0 13.97 10.22 7.42
Total2 15.81 44.07 29.5 15.97 17.61 15.75
'Phase 11 and Phase 111 values are the number ot personnel per y sar.
Table 8. Initial Model Versus Final Model Personnel Required by Phase.
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In Table 8, notice 10.22 students required per year for Phase II versus our initial
model that shows 32.4 students for the entire Phase II length of 5.0 years. Essentially, we
will require 5.0 * 10.22 or approximately 50 students for the entire length of Phase II.
This is not unrealistic ifwe consider for the PANSAT spacecraft over 30 thesis students
conducted research on the satellite. However, after discussing expected throughput of
Space Operations and Space Engineering students with Lisa Quidileg, the Educational
Technician for the Office of the Registrar at NPS, there may not be enough students in
these curricula to provide the expected labor. Per Ms. Quidileg, the following are
expected numbers of students per year for Space Systems Operations and Space Systems
Engineering:
• Space Systems Engineering (Curriculum 591): There are currently 27
students on board NPS. Ms. Quidileg indicated in her discussions with the
Director of Admissions, Mr. Ted Calhoun, the expected numbers for the 591
curriculum are 12 students per year. Expectations are for a single entry into
the curriculum in September, if this holds true, for a curriculum length of
approximately 2.25 years, we should expect a total of approximately 24-36
Space System's Engineering students enrolled at one time. Ifwe assume 15%
of these students have NPSat related thesis topics, then we will have 4-6
students per year.
# Space Systems Operations (Curriculum 366): The expected numbers for
future 366 classes will be 10 students per year. With a curriculum length of
approximately 2.0 years, we can expect 20 students enrolled at one time.
Again, using a 15% value for thesis work, approximately 3 Space Operations
students will be available for labor per year. The 15% factor is based solely on
judgement by the author and should provide the maximum expected number
of thesis students. (Quidileg Interview).
54
The expected total will be 7-9 thesis students per year. This presents quite a
dilemma if we assume our Student Labor values required for NPSat are accurate. The
following recommendations are provided to solve this problem:
, Utilize applicable classes to provide assistance in the design and development
of the NPSat. As an example, for the Space Power and Radiation effects
class, EO 3205, students in this class could receive "hands-on" experience
with NPSat's solar cells and Electrical Power Subsystem.
.
Institute the use of industry "mentors" as discussed earlier in Stanford's use
of these experts. These mentor help reduce "growing pains" in the design
process and provide a measure of relief for the Staff Engineers and Students.
. Use other NPS curriculum students for labor. Electrical and Mechanical
engineering students can provide a wealth of research and labor towards the
NPSat program. Computer Science students can assist Staff Engineers in
developing hardware and software. In addition, Systems Management,
Operations Analysis, and Financial Management students can assist Program
Management and Staff Engineers in analyzing System Engineering,
Cost/Budget, Management, Reliability, Integration and Testing issues.
, Reduce the scope of NPSat's mission. A reduction in mission requirements
will lead to a reduction in fiscal requirements, labor, parts, etc. This is the
only alternative if we assume our labor estimates are fairly accurate.
If we do not attempt to augment our student hours generated by prospective thesis
students, by our estimates, we will fall significantly short of the hours required for
student labor. From our projection of required students, we will fall short of required
labor by approximately 2-4 students per year.
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C. REDUCING THE NPSAT-1 PROGRAM BUDGET
Throughout the preliminary design process, the student engineer design team
focused on improvements to minimize mass, power, cost, and complexity. The following
areas of impact are provided:
a Employ body-mounted solar arrays: For the NPSat-1 design team, body-
mounted arrays were a goal from day one. However, the power requirements
for the payloads are too large to use Silicon body mounted arrays. The use of
body mounted arrays has the following benefits:
1) Reduces spacecraft mass by 14 kg by eliminating the hinge and panel
release mechanisms.
2) Reduces the cost by at least $100,000. ROM figures for these
mechanisms per Appendix (A) demonstrate the hardware alone will
save in excess of $100,000 in Fiscal Year 99 dollars. There will be
additional savings realized for labor which has yet to be determined.
3) Increases the reliability of the spacecraft. See Appendix (XIV) of the
Preliminary Design Report.
4) Simplifies the design.




Generates less power which may force use of more expensive Galium
Arsenide (GaAs) solar cells or the deletion of payloads from the
mission.
2) Solar arrays will be hotter which reduces the solar cell efficiency.
3) Increased internal thermal temperatures will have an impact on the
thermal control scheme of the spacecraft.
# Use GaAs Solar Cells: The current design uses Silicon (Si) cells. The use of
GaAs cells provides the following benefits:
1 Increased power availability.
2) Better performance at the expected higher array temperatures.
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3) Cells suffer less radiation degradation which extends their life.
4) Makes the use of body mounted arrays more achievable.
The main detriment is their higher cost of 2 to 5 times that of Si Cells, or
approximately, and additional $200,000 - $400,000 (FY 1999) dollars.
. Use Lithium Ion (Li-Ion) battery offered by Eagle Picher: This proposal




Free battery saves approximately $ 1 20,000.
2) Mass savings of approximately 3 kg.
3) Li-Ion perform better at expected spacecraft internal temperatures.
Detriments include:
1) New technology with increased mission risk and possible lower
reliability.
2) Unknown length of acquisition timeline compared with more readily
available Nickel Cadmium (NiCad) cells.
3) Li-Ion batteries also demand more stringent charge control
necessitating increased electronics.
4) Li-Ion cells currently do not have the same cycle lifetime as other
space-rated batteries.
a Remove the Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver: The current NPSat-1
design employs a GPS receiver to provide orbit and clock data. From the
PDR on 15 September and a meeting with NRO personnel on 28 September
1999 in Chantilly, Virginia, we are not convinced the GPS is required to
receive clock and orbit information. Benefits of removing the GPS include:
1
)
Mass reduction of 1 .6 kg.
2) Power reduction of 4.7 W peak / 0.5 W average.
3) Saves approximately $200,000.
4) Removes antennas which allows more surface space for possible solar
cells or thermal radiators.
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Possible detriments include:
1) Lack of accurate ephemeris to correlate the auroral images to the
desired accuracy.
2) Removes high accuracy timing signal.
The orbital and timing data along with the pointing knowledge of the
spacecraft are crucial to accurately correlate the images to their actual physical location.
NRO personnel are convinced, from the above meeting, passive methods of determining
ephemeris and providing clock data can be used to alleviate the necessity of GPS on the
satellite.
, Reduce the overall size of the spacecraft: As we discussed in Chapter I,
spacecraft mass is linked to cost. However, we cannot directly use the
parametric for mass in Equation (1-1) from our discussions earlier. Trade
studies must be conducted to explore how NPSat-1 spacecraft mass is
linked to cost and success of the mission.
# Lower the downlink rate: The transponder in the NPSat preliminary has a
ROM cost of $500,000. Lowering the downlink rate may decrease the
cost and complexity but will have an impact on the amount of mission
data that can be collected. This reduction will probably require an
increase in the number of ground stations. This is an area which requires
detailed analysis and could possibly be future thesis project. (Preliminary
Design Report).
In addition to these recommendations for possible cost reduction, there are
additional means in which to lower the actual cost of the program:
. Free components: Dr. Bob Twiggs of the Space Science Design Laboratory at
Stanford University routinely acquires free payloads and components from
industry. Routinely space companies "fly" these components to provide an
opportunity to test hardware in the actual space environment which yield (if
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they operate successfully) a means of acquiring parts which can be marketed
as space-rated. The free Eagle Picher battery discussed above is a direct
example.
Free Labor: Any opportunity a satellite program has to incorporate free labor
for different aspects of the program yields obvious cost savings. For the
NPSat program, NRL and NRO personnel have a wealth of knowledge in the
design, manufacture, integration, and testing of satellites. Accessing these
resources will have an impact in reducing the cost of a satellite. Following
Stanford's use of industry mentors will also aide in reducing labor costs.
Free Testing: Testing and Integration of a satellite can lead to schedule
slippage and unanticipated cost overruns. Again, accessing the NRO and
NRL resources for finding free testing facilities will allow for a reduction in
the price of the program.
Free "Ride": The launch vehicle integration and vehicle costs for the NPSat
program are above $12,000,000. The versatility of the design for
incorporation into any vehicle will greatly increase the opportunity for a free
ride.
Risk: As discussed earlier, Stanford is willing to accept increased risk as long
as it is able to achieve it's ultimate goal of completing the design of a
spacecraft through student labor. COTS equipment and "old-fashioned"
ingenuity in design do increase the risk, but dramatically reduce the cost. This
cost savings is imperative for a satellite developed at a learning institution in
the age of reduced budgets.
Partnerships: Partnerships with other institutions has multiple advantages,
the division of budgetary obligations, access to additional facilities and
equipment, and increased educational opportunities. In addition, these
partnerships help create a liaison between institutions staff, "faculty, and
students. More robust missions can be tackled leading to higher interest from
the satellite industry and government agencies.
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Reduce the scope of the mission: Reducing the mission requirements or
spacecraft necessary capabilities leads to a more simple design which makes
achieving the new mission objective more realizable.
60
V. SUMMARY
A. NPS COST MODEL
The NPS Cost Model is a unique cost model which may provide great insight into
satellite D&D costs for Naval Postgraduate School staff, faculty, and students involved in
a spacecraft program. It is absolutely mandatory, that detailed tracking of fiscal
expenditures, labor hours, and personnel required be performed. If the NPSat spacecraft
is indeed designed to be a modular bus intent for reuse, this tracking will provide a
baseline for future cost analysts and program managers from which valuable lessons
could be drawn. As discussed earlier, the only method we have to determine the
accuracy of the cost model is through this tracking and future comparison with actual
expenditures.
There are many areas which require continued analysis in order to optimize the
capabilities of the NPS Cost Model:
• Follow on research should include travel to various universities with satellite
programs similar to NPS. Detailed examinations of these universities
methods of cost modeling and their actual costs must be conducted. Through
observations of the methodology of these other institutions, we can gather
information on what we can expect to encounter through our program life.
• Additional commercially available cost modeling software programs should
be used as resources. An increase in the number of sources of program costs
will only enhance the cost model. Great care must be observed to ensure the
techniques discussed in the algorithm in Table 2 apply to any additional
sources. This may require tailoring the algorithm to conform.
• The values for calculating Phase III Operations and Maintenance (O&M), or
"Other Dollars", should be reevaluated. The author used $50,000 / yr as a
rough estimate due to a lack of concrete data from industry. Tim Anderson
was consulted to ensure the ratios used to calculate Overhead, Maintenance,
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Fees, Supplies, etc., were within reason. Follow-on research should seek to
gain more concrete data from industry and other educational institutions to
ensure these ratios are indeed realistic. Ideally, a thorough evaluation of
institutions with similar facilities, equipment, and spacecraft would be
conducted to determine a scaling factor which would apply to our
environment here at the Naval Postgraduate School.
• The number of External Engineers required for Phase II seems unrealistic. In
Table 8, 0.15 External Engineers are estimated per year for Phase II. On the
authors judgement solely, this value seems low and should be analyzed to
ensure the estimated labor hours required for External Engineers in the Labor
Worksheets is valid. This could be done by conferring again with the Staff
Engineers, Program Management, and other industry experts.
• The Monte Carlo technique used by the author was based on inputs from Fred
Raymond 's article referenced earlier. This risk assessment is crucial,
however, a reexamination of the implementation of Mr. Raymond's technique
is required. The method, as discussed earlier, does not account for instances
in which the analyst may have overestimated. Granted, this is rarely the case,
as discovered from discussions with Dr. Book and other experts in the
spacecraft industry. However, what if this were the case in our estimate?
There would be no way to recover the actual values which may be below the
"Minimum" value calculated via the matrix in Appendix (B). Tim Anderson
and Jan Young both recommend reevaluating the implementation of this
technique to perform a "normal" Monte Carlo analysis which will prevent the
above dilemma from occurring. A possible follow-on technique would
require evaluating each "figure" to determine the expected distribution of
values and to process this figure via available risk assessment software such as
CRYSTAL BALL. This software program gives the user the ability to
perform numerous random distributions on s specific figure to determine what
the "most likely" expected value.
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• More research is required in determining which fiscal year cost spreading
technique (Beta Distribution, Outlay Profiles, etc.) is more applicable for
inclusion in the model. An evaluation of NPSat's funding line will lead to the
source for fiscal dollars and then provide the analyst with a better
understanding of which method is appropriate.
NPS should eventually be able to arrive at a dedicated CER specific to our
institution which would be the result of heritage of the NPSat program models. This
would provide a rapid method of calculating costs very early in the program. Of course,
this assumes a long line of satellites using the NPSat bus.
B. REEVALUATING NPS' SATELLITE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
PHILOSOPHY
It is imperative, that NPS continue to strive to provide satellite design and
fabrication opportunities for NPS personnel for a more enhanced education. Crucial to
this objective is identifying satellite missions that are within the limits of our institution
from a fiscal and capability standpoint. The success Stanford University has in it's
spacecraft production provides a good lesson for us to possibly follow. Stanford's small
satellite design philosophy is similar to Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL).
SSTL was formed in 1985 as a company wholly owned by the University of Surrey
located in Guildford, England. Their objective is to exploit academic research within the
University's Space Centre to develop and market cost-effective small satellites for rapid
and affordable commercial access to space. The engineers at SSTL have accumulated
many years of comprehensive experience and in-depth knowledge in cost-effective
satellite engineering. Granted, SSTL's staff and facilities are more robust than Stanford,
but their philosophy is basically the same: Produce cost-effective small satellites.
(SSTL). Surrey has demonstrated that extremely low-cost missions can be achieved by
starting cost reduction before selection of mission goals. For many mission managers in
inflexible programs, this is probably an unattainable luxury; for managers faced with
fixed budgets and more flexible orbital aspirations, however, their techniques of selecting
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mission objectives to fit available resources will work \ well. An example of Surrey's
success is Portugese Satellite or PoSAT launched fron cnch Guyana in 1993 onboard
an Ariane vehicle. This 50 kg microsatellite carried five payloads for technology
demonstration and engineering research. SSTL built the satellite for the Portugese
PoSAT Consortium as a part of a technology transfer program. SSTL managed PoSAT-
l's design, construction, and in-orbit operations, so the Consortium could quickly and
inexpensively enter into satellite engineering. From the initial contact between the two
groups, to the end of the post-launch commissioning phase, this program lasted 21
months and cost $2.6 million. Although this mission carried several complex payloads, is
supported by a highly redundant and flexible bus. (We i and Larson, "Reducing Space
Mission Cost", pp 551-553). Their success has lead to SSTL winning numerous
contracts from Korea's KITSAT, U.S. Air Force's MightySat 1 1.1, to DBS Industries for
the development of a constellation of satellites to target hard-to-locate utility meters.
Recently, Surrey's UoSAT-12 was launched from an SS-18 from Kazakhstan in April
1999. This was the first satellite launched from a vehicle which was once one of the
world's most power intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). (SSTL Press Release). A
direct example of Surrey's innovative and somewhat risky approach to satellite
development and delivery.
NPS should incorporate this philosophy and push the "envelope" in developed
spacecraft technology and missions. Future NPS programs should incorporate
propulsion, more sophisticated ADCS systems, tracking solar arrays, and scientific
experiments that are designed by NPS faculty and students. Above all, the ingenuity of
NPS staff, faculty, and students will be decisive factor in making this transition
successfully.
The current curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School for Space System
Operations and Space Systems Engineering students, is designed to prepare graduates as
future program managers for the Department of Defense. The integration of class work
with an actual satellite program that students can actively be involved in from start to
completion is achievable and should prove to enhance this process.
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APPENDIX A. NPSAT-1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN COST BREAKDOWN
Spacecraft Payload ROM|$99| ROMIS03) Power (W) Mass (kq) Spacecraft Bus
CD4H:
ROMIS99I ROMIS03) Power (W) Mass (kg)
LWIR Imaqer GFE GFE 25 00 8 0000
VIS Imagei 200 000 226.000 10 00 5 0000 Chassis 2000 2.260 13
Dosimeter GFE GFE 5.00 31751 336 Processor (2i 6.000 6.780 12.5 5.0
Electron Spt-clionieler 100 000 113.000 200 3 0000 RS-422 Ouad Line Drive (2) 3.000 3.390 -
Subtotal 300 000 339.000 42.00 19 1751 DRAM2I 7 000 "910:
Spacecraft Bus ROM(S99l ROMIJ03) Power <W) Mass (kg) SFtAM 1.500 1.695
Structure: EEPROMi2> J f.oo 4 068
Top Deck 500 00 565 00 U4 3 34 EDAC SRAMI2) 3.000 9.040I
Mid Deck soooo 565 00 NA 3.34 DMA Controller 12' 8.000 9.040
Bottom Deck 500 00 565 00 NA 3.34 Da'a Formatter 3.000 3.390 10 2,5
Fjce 1 500 00 565 00 MA 1.28 Adv Coruro' Unit EPS 3 000 3.390 40 4.0
Face 2 000 00 565 00 NA 1.28 Adv Control Unit ADCS 3.000 3 390 10 40
Face 3 500 00 565 00 NA 1.28 RS-422 Dual Une Driver 2000 2.250'
Face 4 SOOOO 565 00 NA 1.28 CMOS Mux I4l 52 59i
Face 5 500 00 565 00 NA 1.28 Gkie Loqic |2, 1.000 1.1301
Face 6 500.00 565 00 NA 1.28 Current Sensors I 1 0> 40 451
Longerons 500 00 565 00 NA 5.11 DC/DC Converters (2) 200 226:
Lower LV Adaptor Inclw/Lv IncI w/LV NA 5 00 MOSFETsl24. 1 200 1.356'
Uppe' Lv1 Adap'or tncl w/LV Incl w/LV N.A 5 11 Diodes / Caps / Resistors 1,780 2.011
Subtotal 5000.00 5650.00 NA 32.92 Vol References 120 136
Structure Spares: Bidirectional Transceiver 7.500 8 475
Full Structure 5000 00 5650 00 UA 3 34 Octal Bus Latch 7.500 a 475,
Spares Subtotal 5000.00 5650.00 NA 3.14 Buffers / Binary Counters 3 000 3.39o!
Si rue lures Total 10000.00 11300.00 NA 36.26 CDiH Subtotal 72.492 81 916 18.5 28.5
Spacecraft Bus ROM(J99) ROM<$03| PowetlWI Mass (kg! '_D&H Spares ;::: •,:'.:: :::"-' : :-.'.
ADCS/GNC: 306 Processor 3.000 3390 6 25 25
Magnetometer / 000 7.010: i oo 0.12 RS-422 Ouad Line Dnve 1.500 1 635
Star Tracker 130 000 14o900 200 0.80 DRAM 3.500 3,955
WFOV Sensor 1 75 000 34 750 006 11 SRAM 1,500 1.695:
WFOV Sensor 2 75000 64.750 006 0.11 EEPROM 1 800 2.034
NFOV Sensor 1 75000 84 750 006 0.28 EDAC SRAM 4.000 4.520:
NFOV Sensor 2 75 000 84.750 006 0.28 DMA Controller 4.000 4 520 •
GPS 200 000 225 000 050 1.56 Data Formatter 3.000 3390 1 25
Reaction Wheel 20 000 22600 6 50 1.27 Adv Control Unit EPS 3.000 3390 4 4
Torque Rod X 14 500 16.385 0.53 0.43 RS-422 Dual Line Driver 1.000 1 130
Torque Rod Y 14.500 16.385 0.53 0.43 Mux 13 ,5
I
Torque Rod 2 1J5O0 16.385 0.53 0.43 : Sensor/ResisUCaps/ Diodes/etc 1.460 1 650
Subtotal 700.500 791 565 11.83 582 Spares Subtotal 27.773 31.383 11 25 9
ADCS/GNC Spates: .. ..... . — CD&H Total 100.265 113.299 29.8 37.5
WFOV Sensor 75 000 84 750j 06 11 Spacecraft Bus
Power
ROMIS99I ROMIJ03) Power (Wl Mass (kg)
NFOV Sensor 75000 84 750 06 0.28
Magnetometer 7.000 7910 100 0.12
•
Power Control Uml 4.000 4 520l oeo
Torque Rod 14.500 16 385 0.53 043 Barter 120.000 135 600| 19 00
Reaction Wheel 20.000 22.600 6 50 1.27 SA1 45.933 51 9041 1.53
Spares Subtotal 191.500 210.395 8.15 2.21 SA2 45.933 51 904: 1 53


















SA4 45.933 51 9041 1.53
SA5 45.933 51 904i 1 S3
SA6 45.933 51 9041 1.53
Payload Cabling 2.000 2.260l 500
Structure Power Sifttota! 401.598 453.806 • 3398
ADCS/GNC Power Spares: ' • ' :r;. •
,
CDS.H Power Control Uflt 4 0GC 4 520 80
EPS Solar Array (1t 45.933 51 904 1 53
TT&C Battery <4 cells, 20.000 22 600: " 200
Thermal Cablinq 400 452| 5C
Mechanisms 102.129 Spares Subtotal 70.333 79.476 4 33





ROMIJ99I ROM(S03I Power (W) Mass (kg)
20% ROM Mai run 540 044
3.240.265
'iH ="} . -.. .- .-
Total tor Bus & Payload Tx/ Rev Antenna 1 25.000 28 250, 03
Tx I Rev Antenna 2 25.000 28 250 0.23
Transponder 400.000 452 000j 1.05 2.27
Miscellaneous 50 000 56 500' 5 91
TT&C Subtotal 500.000 S65.000 6.05 3.64




TTSC Total 500.000 565.000 6.05 3.64
Spacecraft Bus
Thermal:
ROMII99I ROM(J03| Power (W) Mass (kg)
IiimJjIioti / Coatings 20 000 22 600:
Thermal Subtotal 20.000 22.600
Thermal Spares: . . . ... . • - t . .,.„..v .. .::,. ...
Insulation ,' Coatinos s.ooo 5 650
Spates Subtotal 5.000 5.650
Thermal Total 25.000 28.250
Spacecraft Bus
Mechanisms:
ROM(J99l ROMIJ03] Power (W) Mass (kg)
Documentation 1.200 1 356,
Frangiooltl6) 18.000 20 340 1 oos
Hnoe Unrtsi6i 53.440 66 037 3 46
Mech Subtotal 77.640 37.733 1 3.54
Mech Spares: ., :.,.. . :: •
Franctbot 3.000 3 390! 1 08
Hinge Unrl 9.740 1 1 0061 3 46
Spares Subfotol 12.740 14.396 3.54
Mech Total 90 380 102.129 2 7 08
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Very High (High+) VH 1.0 1.04 1.10
High H 1.0 1.06 1.15
Moderate to High (Mod+) MH 1.0 1.09 1.24
Moderate M 1.0 1.14 1.36
Low to Moderate (Low+) LM 1.0 1.20 1.56
Low L 1.0 1.30 1.85
Very Low to Low (V.Low+) VLL 1.0 1.46 2.31
Very Low VL 1.0 1.68 3.01
Example: For a value of 2.5 with a Moderate to High (MH) confidence level.
Minimum Value =
Most Likely Value =
Maximum Value =
2.5* (1.0) = 2.5
2.5* (1.09) = 2.725
2.5* (1.24) = 3.10
Then take Average = 2.775
The expected value of 2.5 given a confidence of this estimate of Moderate to High is 2.775.
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APPENDIX C. NPSAT-1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN REPORT CALCULATIONS


















Hardware / Materials NA
Testing NA
Software 200
Total Other (Dollars) 8,900
TOTAL Dollars Phase I 48,316
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NPSAT-1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN PHASE II CALCULATIONS
PHASE II
COST MODELS Aerospace Aerospace (NPS| NAFCOM CBS Average
Model Results (FY03$) 27,046.520 30,811,344 20,510,000 21,601,767
Monte Carlo Confidence Rating High* High Low Very Low*
Min 27,046.520 31,207,504 20,510,000 21,601,767
Most Likely 28,128.381 32.660,025 26,663,000 31,538,580
Max 29,751,172 35,433,046 37,943,500 49,900,082
Average 28,308,691 33,100.191 28,372,167 34,346,810 31,031,965
LABOR (DOLLARS) [PHASE II]










Labor for University Environment (30% of 85%) 7,218.716 11,254,065 9,646,537 11,677,915




5,053,101 7,877,846 6,752,576 8,174,541 6,964,516
252.655 393.892 337.629 408.727
10% Overhead 505.310 787,785 675,258 817,454
5% Fees 252.655 393,892 337,629 408,727
5% G&A 252,655 393,892 337,629 408,727
Maint/Overhead/Fees/G&A Subtotal 1,263,275 1,969,461 1,688,144 2,043,635 1,741,129
Staff/Faculty/External Labor for Phase 3,789,826 5,908,384 5,064,432 6,130,906 5,223,387
Staff (55%) 2,084.404 3,249,611 2,785,437 3.371,998 2,872,863
Faculty (10%) 378,983 590,838 506,443 613,091 522,339
External (35%) 1.326.439 2.067.934 1,772.551 2,145.817 1,828,185



































































































TOTAL PERSONNEL [EXCEPT STUDENTS] 10 15 13 16
PHASED.
Satellite Bus Cost (Hardware/Materials)
Satellite Bus Cost (Labor |
Total Bus Cost
Aerospace Aerospace(NPS) NAFCOM CBS Average
4,246,304 4,965,029 4,255,825 3,240,265 4,176,856
5,053,101 7,877,846 6,752.576 8,174,541 6,964,516
9,299,405 12,842,874 11,008,401 11,414,806 11,141,371
Payload Cost + 30% (Hardware/Materials/Labor)
Total Payload Cost
TOTAL FLIGHT UNIT COST
440,700 440,700 440,700 440,700 440,700
440,700 440,700 440,700 440,700 440,700
9,740,105 13,283,574 11,449,101 11,855,506 11,582,071
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Total 27,612 Monte Carlo
LABOR (DOLLARS)
Staff $477,906 Low
Min Most Likely Max
$477,906 $497,022 $525,697
Faculty $309,140 Low $309,140 $321,506 $340,054
Externa] $405,600 Low $405,600 $421,824 $446,160
Total $1,192,646 $1,192,646 $1,240,352 $1,311,911
OTHER (DOLLARS)
Hardware / Materials / Supplies (70%) 79,100 Low
G&A / Fees / Maint / Travel (20%) 22,600 Low
Overhead (10%) 11,300 Low
Total $113,000
Total Dollars Phase ID $1,305,646
Phasem
Monte Carlo Confidence Labor Dollars Other Dollars Total Dollars
Min 1,192,646 113,000 1,305,646




1,248,303 1 18,273 1,366,576
ADJUSTED TOTAL DOLLARS PHASEm $1,366,576
73

APPENDIX D. NPS COST MODEL USER INPUT SCREEN
1
.





Cost Breakdown (CBS) Fit Unit H/Ware Only
PROGRAM DURATION [Integer]
Phase I [CE - PremDesignj
Phase II [PremDesign - Launch]
thase III [Launch - On-Orbit Ops]


















LABOR WORKSHEET HOURS (Thousands) Value Confidence














































2. NPS COST MODEL USER INPUT SCREEN, WAGES AND PHASE III OTHER DOLLARS.









PHASE III OTHER DOLLARS
Costs are automatically calculated via this program. It is not necessary to enter actual values.
YOU MUST ENTER THE CONFIDENCE IN THESE CALCULATED VALUES.
For instance: If you do not think 70% of other dollars spent is accurate for Hardware,etc..
then you would enter the appropriate low confidence code. However, keep in mind
if you expect the percentage to be lower you must either tailor this program or enter
a high confidence. This program always assumes you are underestimating.
If you assume you are overestimating, then the program must be tailored.








NPS COST MODEL LABOR WORKSHEET SCREEN (PHASE I) [INCLUDES INPUTS FOR
REFINED NPSAT- 1 COST ANALYSIS]
Phase I (Concept Exploration thru Preliminary Design)
Labor Hours (in Thousands of Hours)
System Design Staff Engineers/ Staff Faculty Students External Remarks
Structure 0.025 0.010 0.300
Mechanisms 0.025 0.010 0.200
ADCS/GNC 0.035 0.010 0.300
Thermal 0.025 0.010 0.200
TT&C 0.100 0.010 0.300
EPS 0.100 0.010 0.300
CD&H 0.100 0.010 0.300
Software 0.050 0.010 0.050
Ground Support Equipment 0.010 0.005 0.002
Instruments
VIS Imager 0.000 0.010 0.100
Electron Spectrometer 0.000 0.010 0.100
Other
Bus / Payload Integration 0.005 0.005
Testing 0.105 0.000
Msn Dsn / Pin 0.010 0.100
Data Processing 0.125 0.050
Data Analysis 0.105 0.000
Management 0.025 0.100 0.300
Reliability & UA 0.100 0.040
Launch Vehicle Sched/Analysis 0.003 0.040
Mgmt Reserve 0.000
Totals 0.948 0.205 2.687 0.000 3.840
30% Underestimate Margin 0.2844 0.0615 0.8061 1.152
TOTAL 1.232 0.267 3.493 0.000 4.992
76

NPS COST MODEL LABOR WORKSHEET SCREEN (PHASE II) [INCLUDES INPUTS FOR
REFINED NPSAT- 1 COST ANALYSIS]
Phase II (Critical Design thru Mission Readiness Review)
Labor Hours (in Thousands of Hours}
System Design Staff Engineers / Staff Faculty Students External Remarks
Structure 1.200 1.000 0.500 Offbase Fab
Mechanisms 0.600 1.000
ADCS/GNC 1.800 0.200 1.000
Thermal 0.800 0.100 0.500
TT&C 1.000 0.050 0.500
EPS 1.500 0.050 0.500
CD&H 2.400 0.050 0.500
Software 3.000 0.050 0.250
Ground Support Equipmen 1.000 0.050 0.250
Instruments
VIS Imager 0.100 1.000
Electron Spectrometer 0.100 0.500
Other
Bus / Payload Integration 1.500
Testing 0.800 0.100 0.125 0.100
Msn Dsn / Pin 2.200 0.100 0.125
Data Processing 1.200 0.100 0.100
Data Analysis 0.400 0.100
Management 2.000 2.000 0.100
Reliability & QA 1.200 0.100 0.100
Launch Vehicle Integratio i 0.800 0.100 0.400
Training 0.400 0.000 0.050
Mgmt Reserve (35%) 8.330 1.103 2.713 0.368
TOTALS 32.130 4.253 10.463 1.418 48.263
TOTAL 40.460 5.355 13.175 1.785 60.775
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NPS COST MODEL LABOR WORKSHEET SCREEN (PHASE III) [INCLUDES INPUTS FOR
REFINED NPSAT- 1 COST ANALYSIS]
Phase III (Launch thru Operations&Support)
Labor Hours (in ThousandsTof Hours)
Staff Engineers/ Staff Faculty Students External Remarks
Data Collection 3.000 2.000 3.000 Lite of Spacecraft
On Orbit Testing 0.300 2 months
Software Analysis/Eval 0.300 0.250 2 months
Data Processing 3.000 0.150 0.250
Data Analysis 1.000 0.150 2.000
Management 1.000 3.000
Reliability & QA 1.000 0.150
Training 0.300 0.150 0.200
Ground Station Maint 0.200 0.150 0.300 3.000
NPS onsite Maint 0.200 0.150 1.000 .4K Staff hrs Per Year
Mgmt Reserve
TOTALS 10.300 3.900 6.000 6.000 26.200
30% I :1e resum ate Margin 3.09 1.17 1.8 1.8 7.86























Note: Labor values are processed through the Monte Carlo Matrix in App B.
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APPENDIX E. NPS COST MODEL REPORT SCREEN
1
.
REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, EXPECTED PROGRAM COST
EXPECTED PROGRAM COST FY03 $
Spacecraft BUS
Spacecraft PAYLOAD
Labor (Not Including Student Labor)
G&A/FEES/etc (Other Dollars)
GSE




































REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, TOTAL PROGRAM COST
TOTAL PROGRAM COST FY03 $
Phase I (Labor, Materials, Other)
Phase II (Labor, Materials, Other)














TOTAL PROGRAM COST $15,888,597















































































































































REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, PERSONNEL REQUIRED BY PHASE (PHASE
I)









PERSONNEL REQUIRED PHASE I 15.97




1 o f\l\ n Staffiz.xjyj
Faculty












REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, PERSONNEL REQUIRED BY PHASE (PHASE
ID


























REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, PERSONNEL REQUIRED BY PHASE (PHASE
HI)



























10. REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, FLIGHT UNIT COST




























1 1 . REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREENFLIGHT UNIT COST PROBABILITY
DISTRIBUTION
Notes:
65% Probability Flight Unit will be within $ 9,468,377 - $ 12,234,233
95% Probability Flight Unit will be within $ 8,085,445 - $ 13,617,171
in FY 2003$.





12. REFINED NPS COST MODEL, REPORT SCREEN, PROGRAM COST SPREAD OVER PHASE H
AND PHASE III (PHASE I NOT INCLUDED)




























13. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] SCHEDULE DURATION
(MONTE CARLO APPLICATION)
SCHEDULE DURATION MONTE CARLO APPLICATION






90.00 %This is converted to years and added to Total above.
8.13
14. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE 1,11, AND III
LABOR HOURS (MONTE CARLO APPLICATION)
LABOR HOURS MONTE CARLO APPLICATION
Phase 1 Phase II Phase III Phase 1 Phased Phase III
1.232 40.460 13.390 Min 1.785 7.800
1.306 42.888 14.595 Most Likely 1.892 8.502
1.417 46.529 16.604 Max 2.053 9.672
1.319 43.292 14.863 Average 1.910 8.658
59.474 Total 10.56795
Faculty Hours Student Hours
Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase I Phase II Phase III
0.267 5.355 5.070 Min 3.493 13.175 7.800
0.282 5.676 5.526 Most Likely 3.703 15.020 8.502
0.306 6.158 6.287 Max 4.017 17.918 9.672
0.285 5.730 5.628 Average 3.738 15.371 8.658
11.643 Total 27.766
Phase I Phase II Phase III
5.341 66.303 37.807
Note: The Labor hours for Phase II are not used directly. Only the ratio of personnel/total Phase II
hours. For example, Staff to total ratio is 43.292/66.303 which is a ratio of 65.294%. This is multiplied by the
Labor subtotal in the Phase II calculation page. From this value we can arrive at a dollar amount for Staff for
Phase II. Dividing by the Staff engineer wage of $65/hr.. this yields the actual number of Phase II Staff hours
expected per the Report page of the NPS COST MODEL.
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$ 1 .5 4
1 1 O , S 3 S
Total P b . . e I $ $379,912
LABOR (Hears) for PHASE 1/ Tear
Staff








LABOR (Hours) Available for ONE person / Tear
Staff
F a c u 1 t y








PERSONNEL REQUIRED for PHASE 1












16. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE II
PHASEH
COST MODELS Aerospace (NFS) NAFCOM CBS Average
Model Results (FY03$) $27,046,520 $20,510,000 $21,601,767
Monte Carlo Confidence Rating VH MH M
Min $27,046,520 $20,510,000 $21,601,767
Most Likely $28,128,381 $22,355,900 $31,538,579
Max $29,751,172 $25,432,400 $49,900,081
Average $28,308,691 $22,766,100 $34,346,809 $28,473,867
LABOR (DOLLARS) [PHASE H]
Labor with Single Contractor (85%)
Aerospace(NPS) NAFCOM CBS Average
$24,062,387 $19,351,185 $29,194,788
Labor for Univ. Environment (40% of 85%) $9,624,955 $7,740,474 $11,677,915




$6,737,468 $5,418,332 $8,174,541 $6,776,780
$336,873 $270,917 $408,727 $338,839
10% Overhead $673,747 $541,833 $817,454 $677,678
5% Fees $336,873 $270,917 $408,727 $338,839
5%G&A $336,873 $270,917 $408,727 $338,839
Maint/Overhead/Fees/G&A Subtotal $1,684,367 $1,354,583 $2,043,635 $1,694,195
Pure Labor $ for Phase II $5,053,101 $4,063,749 $6,130,905 $5,082,585
Staff $3,299,405 $2,653,410 $4,003,153 $3,318,656
Faculty $436,686 $351,187 $529,829 $439,234
External $145,562 $117,062 $176,610 $146,411
Student $1,171,449 $942,090 $1,421,314 $1,178,284
NOTES:
Staff Labor dollars are calculated by the following:
Find Labor Ratio: Staff Labor Average Hours for Phase / Labor total(Staff/Faculty/Extemal/Student
This is found in the Calculations Section of this workbook.
This Ratio is then multiplied by the Pure Labor $ for Phase D" above.
Similarly for Faculty, External, 8c Student-
Due to the duration of Phase n (Design and Development), the ratios are probably more accurate than the actual
Labor Hour figures from the worksheet completed by the user in the NPSMODEL Spreadsheet
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1 7. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE II - PAGE 2
LABOR(HOURS» [PHASE U\
Staff
AerospaoefNPS) NAFOOM CSS Average
50,760 40,822 61,587 51,056
Faculty 3,385 2,722 4,107 3,405
Baemal 1,128 907 1,369 1,135
Student 25,466 20,480 30,898 25,615
Total 80,740 64,932 97,961 81,211




Faculty 675 543 819 679
Ettemai 225 181 273 226
Student 5,080 4,085 6,163 5,109
Total 16,105 12,952 19,540 16,199
LABOR (Hours) Avail for 1 person / Year
Staff 1,500 1,500 1.500 1,500
Faculty 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
External 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Student 500 500 500 500
Total 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
PERSONNEL REQD for PHASE H
Staff 6.8 5.4 a2 6.8
Faculty 0.5 <X4 0.5 0.5
EMxral 0.2 ai 0.2 02
student ia2 8.2 12.3 10,2








$3,633,828Satellite Bus Cum. (Hardware/ Ivfcilenals)
Satellite Bus Oast (Labor) $6,737,468 $5,418,332 $8,174,541 $6,776,780
Total Bus Cost $10,983,772 $8,833^47 $11,414,806 $10,410,608
Payload Cost + 30% (Hardware /Materials/labor) $440,700 $440,700 $440,700 $440,700
Total Payfoad Cost $440,700 $440,700 $440,700 $440,700
TOTAL FLIGHT UNITCOST $11,424,472 $9,273,947 $11,855,506 $10,851,308
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18. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE III
FHASEDI





Faculty 5.070 MH 5.628


















G&A / Fees / Maint / Travel (20P/c) $23,333 M $27,222









Total "OTHER (DOLLARS)" is calculated by the following ™-th"H-
ASSUME $50,000/year for OTHER
Multiply by 1. 13 to convert from FY99 to FY03 dollars
Result is then multiplied by Average duration for Phase ID calculated in
"Calculations" section of this workbook.
Hardware /Materials/Supplies is approximately 70% ofOTHER DOLLARS totaL
G&A/Fees/Maint/Trawel is approximately 20% of OTHER DOLLARS totaL
Overhead is approximately 10% ofOTHER DOLLARS totaL
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1 9. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE III - PAGE 2.


































20. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE in LABOR





$1,065086 Mast Likely $1,217,401
$1,197,950 Mhk $1,384,934
$1,072353 Average $1,239,739
Fatuity Dollars Studert Dollars
Phase III Fhaselll
$725973 Mn $333,268




DOLLARS (MONTE CARLO APPLICATION)
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21. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] PHASE III OTHER
1
phasem OTHER DOLLARS" MONTE CARLO APPLICATION
Hardware, Materials,Suppliess(70%) G&A,Fees,Maint.Travel(20%)
$81,667 Min $23,333





$12,367 Total OTHER $ $140,194
$13,417
$12,483
DOLLARS (MONTE CARLO APPLICATION)
22. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] GROUND SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT (NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY PHASE)
GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TNOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY PHASE1
Ground Support Equipment





Ground Support Equipment is any equipment required
to support specific hardware elements of a sub-
system. ASSUME $100,000 FY03$ FOR TOTAL.
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23. NPS COST MODEL CALCULATIONS [REFINED NPSAT ANALYSIS] FISCAL YEAR COST
** FhaseUoaispreadisvia^artfffa-a^
FDRSE Fhase El cast spread is total phase ID cost dvided by ruifercfyears (lor eachyear)









FYI $1,701,673 FYI $5,281,539
FYD $1,701,673 FYD $3,516551
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